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Consistently and comprehensively using Information Operations (IO) 
capabilities as a primary weapon option within the Air Force is the next step to 
operationalizing IO within the Air Force. Doctrine and official guidance have set 
the variables of mission and concepts of operations, organizational structure, and 
IW players in place. The missing variable to operationalizing IO and probably the 
most difficult is the "how" or process of the equation. 
This research will introduce a useable process that can be incorporated 
within the Air Force for integrating offensive IW activities into the current and 
given environment. The process is the basis for further decomposition and 
identification of target aim points. In addition, it's use of effect points should aid 
in focusing long-range, deliberate, and crisis action planning on the possible 
desired effects on an adversary. 
The research sets the stage by briefly defining the first three variables; 
organization, mission, and players in which AF IW is practiced and the inherent 
deliverables required. It will then introduce a view and decomposition of the 
information battlespace as the basis for offensive IW activities where affecting 
the information factors in order to induce a desired decision to achieve desired 
effects is the overall goal. 
IX 
A PROCESS FOR VECTORING OFFENSIVE INFORMATION 
WARFARE, AS A PRIMARY WEAPON OPTION 
WITHIN THE AIR FORCE 
1    Introduction 
1.1    General Issues 
The information environment, with it's inherit capabilities and 
vulnerabilities, has continued to grow into a complex system of people, hardware, 
software, processes, and information. This environment has the ability to 
process, store, and transport large amounts of information in a vast array of 
products and services and at speeds once unimaginable. The nation's 
dependency upon these capabilities has made the country and her assets 
vulnerable to potentially devastating attacks. This increasing importance to 
control information has become a necessity in conducting warfare in the 21st 
century. Air Force doctrine highlights this point: 
"...the possession and manipulation of information itself can be a 
key element of the war-winning equation. More than at any other 
time in history, information has evolved from being only an adjunct 
supporting primary weapon systems to, in many cases, being itself 
a weapon or target." 
AFDD 2-5, 1998:1-2 
The above quote also underscores the important need for IW to become 
"itself a weapon" to be used to deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy an adversary's 
military organization through affecting the value of information, information 
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systems, and information based processes. This integration of full spectrum 
Information Operations (10) must become a major focus of the Air Force's 
operational art (AFDD 2-5,1998: 4). 
1.2   Background 
Currently there is a gap between Joint and Air Force doctrine and real world 
operations in the Air Force Information Operations (I0) arena. Steps in bridging 
this gap have been the finalization of guidance, definitions, and organizational 
structure as outlined in Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations, AFDD 2-5 
Information Operations, AF's Concept of Operation for Information Warfare (IW), 
the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, as well as, the recent compilation 
of the IW Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). To solidify and lend 
credence to the guidance, definitions, and structure, the AF I0 community must 
take the next step and employ a theory of operations suited for use within the 
operational and tactical level of operations. In order for the "IW weapon system" 
to move from its current supporting function to a primary weapon option, this 
theory of operations must be built upon striving to present offensive IW 
capabilities as a supported primary weapon option that is considered and utilized 
at every appropriate opportunity. 
1.3   Problem Statement 
AFDD 2-5 states, "IW capabilities should be considered and integrated 
into the overall theater campaign, not just as an add on—but as a primary 
capability the Air Force brings to the conflict" (AFDD 2-5,1998: 32). However, a 
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missing link exists in the utilization of offensive IW as a primary weapon option. 
AF doctrine and official guidance has identified the variables of mission, 
organizational structure, and required personnel, but not the "how". The process 
equations, which translate the designs of doctrine into operational procedures 
that place offensive IW capabilities in full motion as a primary weapon option in 
our national arsenal, are currently undeveloped. 
In order for IW to become a primary weapon option, in contrast to its 
current supporting role to kinetic and traditional forms of warfare, it's capabilities 
and effects must be presented and translated within the current and future 
potential battlespace.   The critical question is, 
"How can offensive IW be integrated within the AF as a primary 
weapon choice?" 
This thesis attempts to address the question in two parts. First, this work 
applies a combination of techniques and steps drawn from business re- 
engineering, strategic management, and basic planning techniques, in order to 
identify and define the essential factors of a new and developing organization. 
These essential factors, mission, vision, goals, product(s), environment, and 
deliverables are outlined in Chapter 4. This identification is a key step in being 
able to transform an organization within one's current environment to a more 
prominent and beneficial setting. 
A shortcoming of current doctrine is the limited guidance on "how" to 
"integrate" 10 at all levels.   The second part of this thesis is a proposed process 
developed with a focus upon the needs of its customers and the deliverables for 
1-3 
its users. A process that can be used within the current Air Force structure is 
developed for offensive IW. 
In summary, this thesis identifies the necessary concepts and definitions 
to develop a useable, useful, and systematic process to produce the appropriate 
deliverables of target nominations, weaponeered targets, and effects assessment 
indicators for IW. All of these pieces can serve as the foundation for developing 
a baseline of knowledge needed for integrating offensive IW activities into the 
current Air Force planning and execution environment.   While not the final 
answer in the transition of IW to a primary weapon choice at the operational 
level, it does provide a roadmap for the next steps in the journey. 
1.4   Approach 
Field observations, interviews, and a review of available literature, 
including but not limited to AF doctrine have been utilized to define the Air Force 
IO community, its organization, mission, and players.   The qualitative research 
method of constant comparison, progressive analysis, clarification, and evolving 
conclusions was used to conduct data collection and continuous analysis. With 
the use of basic planning steps, strategic management techniques, and business 
re-engineering analysis, the targeting cycle environment was further broken 
down into customers and customer requirements, decision cycles and decision 
requirements, in order to determine the essential deliverables of the AF IW 
community. 
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Through the incorporation of several basic concepts concerning effects 
based operations, aerospace operations center (AOC) operations, target and 
combat assessment analysis, a systematic process has been developed 
presenting a theory of operations with the goal of presenting the capabilities of 
information warfare weapons as a supported weapon system. The concepts, 
definitions, and process will then be presented to a community of subject matter 
experts for their review and initial assessment for use by the 10 community. 
1.5   Overview 
This thesis is structured in the following manner.   Chapter Two presents a 
literature review of the key factors describing the different areas of study 
incorporated within the thesis; information operations, effects based operations, 
targeting and combat assessment concepts, information value and objective 
hierarchies. Chapter Three describes the methodology followed and evolving 
paths taken throughout the research process. Chapter Four provides the 
concepts resulting from the grounded, comparative analysis and the suggested 
I0 planning process focused around the deliverables and customer needs of the 
I0 planner. This portion of the work has also been tailored into a report for the 
Institute of Security Studies, the AF Research Laboratories—Human 
Effectiveness Branch, and the 23rd and 39th Information Operations Squadron. 
Chapter Five provides the analysis and findings of two assessment feedback 
activities performed. Chapter Six outlines overall conclusions, insights, and 
future research opportunities and recommendations. In addition, several 
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appendixes are included to support this research and to act as repositories of the 
presentation and collection instruments used. Appendix A outlines the additional 
research developed in an effort to validate the IW Weaponeering & Force 
Application phase of the developed process. In addition, pilot and preliminary 
study results, and a brief initial analysis of findings are included. Appendix B 
contains a table of the modified measures of effectiveness items and a summary 
of offensive action definitions that accompanies the IW Battlespace. Appendix C 
is used as a repository of the research instruments used during this study. 
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2    Literature Review 
2.1    Introduction 
Information Operations (IO) and its offensive component, Information 
Warfare (IW), have posed many challenges to the current operational and tactical 
environment of the Air Force. As suggested by several documents offering 
guidance in the integration of IO into the structure of the Air Force, it is essential 
for IO to be incorporated throughout the different levels of operations; strategic, 
operational, and tactical. This chapter provides an overview of the planning and 
targeting processes and defines the array of aspects that make up the key 
factors investigated within this research.   These key factors are the different 
levels of operations, the Information Operations environment, the Aerospace 
Operations Center; effects based operations, targeting and combat assessment 
concepts, and the development of an environment assessment research model. 
2.2   The Levels of Operations; Strategic, Operational, and Tactical 
"Offensive IO may be conducted at all levels of war, inside and outside the 
traditional military battlespace" (JP 3-13,1998:11-9). The boundaries between the 
different levels are not always distinct and one must always be sensitive to the 
effects of an IW action upon the other levels of war. Consideration of the effect 
should not be isolated to the level being planned (JP 3-13,1998:1-2). 
Table 2-1 presents the definitions of the different levels of war or 
operations. It is included here to provide the reader with a reference of terms 
that will be used throughout this thesis. 
2-1 
Table 2-1. Levels of Operations—Summary of Definitions 
Levels of Operations Definitions 
Strategic Level of Operations The level of war at which a nation, often as a 
member of a group of nations, determines national 
or multinational (alliances or coalition) security 
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses 
national resources to accomplish these objectives. 
Activities at this level establish national and 
multinational military objectives; sequence 
initiative; define limits and assess risks for the use 
of military and other instruments of national power; 
develop global plans or theater war plans to 
achieve these objectives; and provide military 
forces and other capabilities in accordance with 
strategic plans 
(JP1-02, 1994:439) 
Operational Level of Operations The level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained 
to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or 
areas of operations. Activities at this level link 
tactics and strategy by establishing operational 
objectives needed to accomplish the strategic 
objectives, sequencing events to achieve the 
operational objective, initiating actions, and 
applying resources to bring about and sustain 
these events. These activities imply a broader 
dimension of time or space than do tactics; they 
ensure the logistic and administrative support of 
tactical forces, and provide the means by which 
tactical successes are exploited to achieve 
strategic objectives. 
(JP 1-02, 1994:335) 
Tactical Level of Operations The level of war at which battles and engagements 
are planned and executed to accomplish military 
objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. 
Activities at this level focus on the ordered 
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in 
relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve 
combat objectives. 
(JP 1-02, 1994:453) 
2.3   Information Operations 
Cornerstones of Information Warfare, released in 1995, was the Air 
Force's first public interpretation of Information Warfare. It led the refinement 
and growth of what is known as Information Operations. In addition to 
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"Cornerstones", the most notable Air Force guidance and documents for 
Information Operations are the AF Doctrine Document 2-5 Information 
Operations (AFDD 2-5) published in August 1998, and the USAF Concept of 
Operations for Information Warfare (CONOPS) released in December of 1999. 
These documents have redefined the concepts and definitions of IO and IW 
since the release of "Cornerstones" in 1995.   These documents are used 
extensively as guidance to the IO environment, structure, and definitions. 
2.3.1   The Structure and Definitions of Information Operations 
AFDD 2-5 is a document that continues to build the stage for the growth 
and refinement of Information Operations within the Air Force. Written at the 
doctrine (highest) level of AF policymaking, AFDD 2-5 defines the two major 
elements of Information Operations; Information-in-Warfare and Information 
Warfare. Figure 2-1, taken from AFDD 2-5 is the AF Information Superiority 
Construct and illustrates the concept of AF Information Operations in support of 
one of AF's core competencies, Information Superiority. This construct outlines 
the structure of the IO components within the AF and its essential and supporting 
role to achieving Information Superiority. 
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Air Force Information Superiority Construct 
Precision Navigation & Positioning 













Source: AFDD 2-5, 1998: 3 
Figure 2-1. AF Information Superiority Construct 
Information Superiority is not a new concept, but has evolved into more 
than just an end state. Joint Vision 2020 extends the importance of Information 
Superiority as a vital support function in the obtainment of superior knowledge 
and decision superiority (JV 2020, 2000:11). Table 2- 2 includes the definition of 
Information Superiority, as well, as other IO related terms. These terms are 
included here as a brief review and reference of the key terms within the 
information environment. 
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Table 2- 2. Key Terms within the Information Environment 
Definitions of Information Related Terms 
Information Superiority (IS) The capability to collect, process, and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting or denying an 
adversary's ability to do the same. 
(JP 1-02, 1994:223) 
The ability to control and exploit information 
to our nation's advantage. 
(AF 2020, 2000: 5 ) 
Information Operations (IO) Those actions taken to affect an adversary's 
information and information systems while 
defending one's own information and 
information systems. 
(JP 1-02, 1994:223) 
Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend, 
or attack information and information systems 




(Gain and Exploit) 
Involves the AF's extensive capabilities to 
provide global awareness throughout the 
range of military operations based on 
integrated intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information 
collection/dissemination activities; and its 
global navigation and position, weather, and 
communications capabilities. 
(AFDD 2-5, 1998:41) 
Note: Joint Doctrine does not recognize the term IIW 
The information required to provide total 
battlespace awareness, superior battlespace 
knowledge, in order to achieve decision 
superiority. IIW includes information about 
the adversary, as well as oneself. 
(Proposed definition) 
Information Warfare 
(Attack and Defend) 
Information operations conducted during time 
of crises or conflict to achieve or promote 
specific objectives over a specific adversary 
or adversaries. 
(JP 1-02, 1994: 224) 
Information operations conducted to defend 
one's own information and information 
systems, or to attack and affect an 
adversary's information and information 
systems. 
 (AFDD 2-5, 1998:42) 
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Joint and AF doctrine are referenced and included in Table 2- 2 in order to 
highlight the differences that may exist between these two levels. One important 
distinction is that Information Operations, as viewed by the Air Force, is made up 
of two separate and distinct pillars; Information-ln-Warfare and Information 
Warfare. 
Information-ln-Warfare (IIW). The definition in AFDD 2-5 (given in Table 
2- 2) is unlike other definitions and seems to only describe the capabilities that 
provide IIW instead of stating an action or a specific capability. In an attempt to 
align the definition of IIW with the other terms within 10, the following is the 
proposed definition to be used within this research. 
IIW is the information required to provide total battlespace 
awareness, superior battlespace knowledge, in order to achieve 
decision superiority. IIW includes information about the adversary, 
as well as oneself. 
Battlespace awareness and knowledge is obtained through the collection, 
organization, and analysis of information in which a relative and comprehensive 
view of the playing field(s) is developed. This comprehensive view would enable 
all combat planners of various weapon systems to be able to allocate their 
weapons' capabilities against the critical nodes of the adversary's organizational 
system. The ability to see a clear battlespace would lead to the ultimate goal of 
superior battlespace knowledge and decision superiority within the battlespace. 
Information Warfare (IW). The key focus on IW is the elements of defend 
and attack.   One of the key differences between the two elements of IW is that 
the defend side is always engaged (AFDD 2-5,1998: 42).   In addition, defensive 
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actions require everyone's total cooperation and diligence within the system in 
order to keep the system secure. The old adage applies, "A chain is as strong as 
its weakest link".   The security of a system is only as strong as its weakest 
member. Offensive actions, however, can be executed by one or many, upon 
one or many, and with a varied objective, intensity, persistence, or time interval. 
It is important to ensure both elements of IW must be considered, integrated, and 
be accomplished in support of the other. Each element must be planned and 
executed in concert (AF CONOPS, 1999:4). 
The pillars of IO, IIW and IW, must be closely integrated with each other 
and with all aerospace functions; reach, power, awareness, and knowledge. One 
must remember that IW missions are the actions taken within the adversary or 
ones own battlespace that affects the shape of the battlespace. IIW, on the other 
hand, provides a relevant and evolving view of the shape of the battlespace. The 
emphasis on IO and the need for the integration of IO at the operational and 
tactical levels is key to the war-winning equation. IO must evolve from being only 
an adjunct supporting primary weapon systems, to being itself a weapon or target 
(AFDD 2-5,1998: 2). A key battlespace of this century will be the information 
realm. 
2.3.2  The Environment of AF IO 
The release of USAF CONOPS for IW was the next step the AF took to 
describe "how" the Air Force employs IW into existing functions. It outlined the 
need for the AF efforts to focus on implementing IW capabilities through 
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warfighting component commands in support of joint warfighting commands 
(AFDD 2-5, 1998: 7). Another requirement is that "IW activities and operations 
must be integrated within the normal campaign planning and execution process" 
(AFDD 2-5, 1998: 7). The purpose of the CONOPS was to outline the mission, 
the organizational structure, and those with primary responsibilities for IO within 
the AF community. These elements are key to this thesis and are developed in 
the following sections. 
The Mission ofAF 10. The Air Force's vision and mission for 10 is to 
establish and maintain information superiority over the adversary and to provide 
the best battlespace information to the right place—anywhere, anytime (AF 
CONOPS, 1999: iii).   Offensive IW activities are conducted to control the 
information environment to acquire and maintain information superiority, 
therefore, enabling the accomplishment of theatre and mission objectives (AF 
CONOPS, 1999:1). Coordination and synchronization of defensive and 
offensive actions are essential to incorporate full spectrum IO capabilities across 
the entire battlespace (AF CONOPS, 1999: 4). 
Both Joint and Air Force doctrine and guidance consistently compliment 
each other in identifying the mission of IO as a means to acquiring information 
superiority and the need to integrate and operationalize IW activities within the 
appropriate service's organizational structure. 
In light of the overall AF mission for IO, offensive IW actions focus on the 
manipulation (denial, disruption, and degradation) or destruction of information in 
order to support efforts to affect the desired strategic, operational, and tactical 
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objectives or effects.    The mission to integrate 10, as stated in the AF 
CONOPS, is a difficult task that will require changes within the AF 10 and IW 
organizational structure, its mission, its personnel, and its process.   The primary 
focus of the tactical level is to deny, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise control an 
adversary's use of information (JP 3-13,1998,11-11). 
In addition, IW activities and operations must be integrated within the 
normal campaign planning and execution process, making the consideration and 
use of IW second nature (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 7).   To fully exploit the potential 
power of IW, it must become a primary weapon system of consideration and use 
in the achievement of strategy and objectives at all levels of operations. 
The Organizational Structure. The organizational structure of I0 at the 
operational and tactical level of the USAF unfolded through the finalization of the 
Air Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for IW in December 1999. This 
structure was set by the incorporation of the IW flight embedment within selected 
MAJCOMS and Numbered Air Forces (NAF) across the world. These flights 
have become part of the NAF while in-garrison and are incorporated as specialty 
teams within the deployed Aerospace Operations Center (AOC) (AF CONOPS, 
1999:11). The structure, purpose, and mission of the AOC is the driving force 
on how IW activities can be incorporated into the Air Force as a primary weapon 
option.   In this situation, the IW Flights are the primary "customers" of this 
research. In order to meet a customer's needs, one must understand the 
organizational structure of AF I0, and have insight into the AOC's structure and 
major processes. The next section provides this insight. 
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The Aerospace Operations Center (AOC). The AOC is the senior 
operations center of the Theater Air Control System (TACS) and the focal point 
for the Command and Control (C2) of air forces (AFI 13-1 AOC, 1999:10). It 
provides the facility and personnel to accomplish planning, directing, and 
coordinating theater air operations (AFI 13-1AOC, 1999:10). The organization 
and processes of the AOC must be able to cover the entire range of 
responsibilities from campaign planning to daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) 
execution (AF113-1 AOC, 1999:16).   In short, the responsibility of the AOC is to 
perform a complex set of processes. The AF instruction for operational 
procedures for the AOC describes the process as follows: 
"Daily planning for the employment of forces in combat is a 
complex process of integrating force capabilities and limitations 
against enemy vulnerabilities to achieve optimum results in an 
ever-changing tactical environment". 
AFI 13-1AOC3 
The basic AOC organizational structure consists of a director and four 
divisions; strategy, combat plans, combat operations, and air mobility.   The 
overall tasks of these divisions are described by the functions of the Aerospace 
Plan Development process. 
The Aerospace Plan Development is the underlying process of the AOC 
and consists of four major functions (AFI 13-1 AOC, 1999: 17). Each of these 
functions plays a critical role in the accomplishment of the AOC's mission. Table 
2- 3 summaries each of these functions. 
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Table 2- 3. Description of AOC Functions 
AOC Functions Description 
Aerospace Strategy Development and 
Articulation 
This function incorporates many 
diverse subtasks to include theater 
campaign planning, preparation of the 
battlespace at the strategic and 
operational levels to planning 
considerations of target selection, 
mission execution and 
synchronization/timing, and weapon 
and resource availability.  
ATO and ATO Production The production of timely, coordinated, 
and executable air tasking and air 
control orders. 
ATO Execution The monitoring, executing, and 
adjusting of the operations for the 
current air tasking order.  
Operational Assessment The continuous evaluation of the 
results of operations based on desired 
effects to achieve desired objectives. 
Source: AFI13-1AOC3, 1999; 17-22 
Within the AOC there are a number of standardized processes used to 
synchronize the efforts of the Center across the divisions. The most prominent is 
the Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle, which provides for the efficient and effective 
employment of joint air capabilities/forces made available (JP 3-56.1,1994: IV-4). 
The ATO is the detailed plan for the application of air resources, which 
encompasses unit mission data, unit remarks, and special instructions.   It is a 
critical, time-sensitive document that tasks and authorizes units in the application 
of air power resources. 
Figure 2- 2 highlights the major milestones within the ATO cycle in its 
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Summary of the major milestones and products mapped across the 72 hour ATO cycle. 
ATO-Air Tasking Order 
MAAP-Master Air Attack Plan 
JIPTI—Joint Integrated Priority Target List 
Source: 8AF Blue Flag Briefing Slides, 2000 
Figure 2- 2. Sequential depiction of the Joint ATO Cycle 
Deeply intertwined within the ATO process is the targeting cycle. This 
process integrates requirements, capabilities, and efforts of all command levels. 
It is an analytical and systematic approach that matches available air assets, 
resources, and capabilities to threat vulnerabilities of target sets or aimpoints to 
accomplish objectives. 
Figure 2- 3 is an illustration of the targeting cycle and the incorporation of 
the major products of the ATO cycle. 
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Summary of the Targeting Cycle and Major ATO product deliverables 
Source: 8AF Bine Fltg Briefing Slides, 2000 
Figure 2- 3. Targeting Cycle and ATO Product Deliverables 
Both the ATO and the targeting cycles work hand-in-hand to provide an 
efficient and effective means for planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking 
air missions with the end result of meeting the stated strategy and objectives. 
Figure 2- 4 places each of the cycles side by side to illustrate how each 




































Figure 2- 4. Joint ATO and Targeting Cycles 
Figures 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 illustrate the AOC's organizational structure and 
processes that dictate timing and product requirements. In addition, to fully 
exploit the full spectrum of available weapons and capabilities, there are several 
deliverables that evolve from the targeting cycle that the IO planner must 






Combat    \ —{    Target     \  Target 
^Assessment-*- .. '•^Nominations, development J 
Assessment  \ " *0*- 
\ Indicators ,■' \ 
k {     Targets 
ForCe    .''Assessment^,, '^"'"""'''^pomvk^ 
Execution ^ Indicators   r ,     Weapons    & Allocate 
Force 
Application 
10 Deliverables C"_"~;:;:> 10 Inputs 
B> Phases requiring IO planner input 
Figure 2- 5. 10 Deliverables and Inputs 
Figure 2- 5, highlights the phases requiring 10 planner inputs, the specific 
inputs, and deliverables into the planning cycles of the AOC. 
Manpower. To obtain the goal of information operations (attaining a 
degree of information superiority, which allows us to collect, control, exploit, and 
defend information without effective opposition) the Air Force has created teams 
of experts in the basic elements of 10; Information-ln-Warfare (IIW) and IW 
(defensive and offensive) (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 2). These teams, termed IW Flights, 
are located within selected MAJCOMs and Numbered Air Forces. These IW 
Flights are intended to provide the command organization with operational IW 
planning and implementation capabilities within the Air Force (AF CONOPS, 
1999:11). 
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Each flight consist of a cross-functional team of experts in order to 
facilitate deliberate and crisis action planning and contingency execution across 
the full spectrum of offensive and defensive IW activities. During contingency 
operations, the flight is deployed as a specialty team within the AOC and 
represents the IW capability within all four divisions of the AOC; strategy, combat 
plans, combat operations, and air mobility (AF CONOPS, 1999:11). 
2.4   Effects Based Operations 
The concept of effects based operations is paramount to the effective 
integration and use of offensive IW actions and weapons as a primary option. 
AFDD 2-5 states, "commanders must focus on the strategic, operational, and 
tactical effects desired in any particular situation and bring to bear the right mix of 
all capabilities to achieve those effects" (AFDD 2-5,1998: 3). Effects based 
operations, as defined by a draft product titled Concept of Operations for Effects 
Based Operations, is an "approach to planning, executing, and assessing military 
operations upon on the desired effects of an action(s)" (EBO-Draft, 2001: 2). 
"Fundamental to AF's success is its ability to focus on the effects 
desired to achieve campaign objectives, at all levels of operations. 
It holds true for IO as for any other air and space capability". 
Planners should clearly define the desired effect, then identify the 
optimum capability for achieving that effect." 
AFDD 2-5, 1998:27-28 
Joint Vision 2010 and 2020's operational concept of Precision 
Engagement is effects based and relevant to all types of operations. The Air 
Force highlighted its importance by identifying it as an AF core competency.   In 
addition, the AF IO community must also focus on accomplishing precision 
2-16 
engagement. "Precision engagement is the ability of forces to locate, surveil, 
discern, and track objectives or targets, select, organize, and use the correct 
systems; generate desired effects: assess results; and reengage with decisive 
speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full 
range of military operations". (JV2020, 2000: 28) A key to precision 
engagement is achieving an appropriate level of information superiority. 
2.5   Targeting Cycle Concepts 
The targeting cycle is a decision-planning framework used at both the joint 
and Air Force levels of planning and execution.   As mentioned earlier, the 
targeting cycle, along with the ATO cycle, drives all planning functions within the 
AOC. It is a major, deeply engrained process that provides structure to a chaotic 
scene of activity. Due to the targeting cycle's extensive use within the AOC, the 
given environment that the IW Flights will operate, it is incorporated into this 
research in two capacities. First, the targeting and ATO cycles are used as a 
basis to analyze the environment and in determining the deliverables within this 
environment. Second, the targeting cycle is used as a guide for the proposed 
process focused on customer needs and the applicable deliverables. 
Several other targeting concepts are also used to help in identifying the 
needed weapon characteristics of offensive IW actions. The concepts, target 
sets, delivery tactics, delivery platform, and payload also help to align offensive 
actions into more plausible, identifiable, and measurable units. The identification 
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of these important weapon characteristics helps to further decompose the IW 
action into "aerospace" terms as used within the Aerospace Operations Center. 
2.5.1   Target, Target System, and Target Set 
The target is the basic starting point of which many other targeting 
processes are based on. In its simplest form, "a target is a thing or place to be 
aimed at or hit" (AFP 14-210,1998:126). Several other definitions are described 
and used tending to a broaden scope of a target. The first states "a target that is 
a geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction 
by military forces" (AFP 14-210,1998:127). Another useful definition borrowed 
from the intelligence community is that a target is a country, area, installation, 
agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed (AFP 14- 
210, 1998: 127). 
The target system is another important concept. The target system is' 
defined by describing two similar, but distinct definitions. A target system 
includes all targets that are functionally related within a particular geographic 
area or any group of related targets that will produce a particular effect if 
destroyed (AFP 14-210, 1998: 18). 
A target set was not formally defined within the targeting literature, but is 
used within the AF Concept of Operations for IW and within many informal 
discussions throughout the research. A definition was developed in order to 
reflect the meaning used by participants and researcher. The term "set" can be 
defined as "a group of persons or things classed or belonging together" 
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(Websters, 1991: 520). This definition for set was added to the simplest definition 
of target, a thing or place to be aimed at or hit. This combination yielded a 
description of a target set that describes its use in the CONOPS and discussions 
within the IO community. A target set is a group of persons or things belonging 
together that can give focus and aim for fulfilling specific command or mission 
objectives. 
2.5.2  Tactic, Platform and Payload 
Establishing weapon requirements and selecting the best available 
weapon requires knowledge about our weapon capabilities and limitations. This 
knowledge is not always straightforward and is often classified. Throughout the 
open literature, there is very little available that formally defined any type of 
weapon characteristics. The definitions used in this study are described below. 
Tactics or Methods. Tactics and methods tend to be spoken 
interchangeably and seem to be readily accepted as a way of doing anything or a 
process. A definition of tactics was found and shows us a different view. 
"Tactics is defined as the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in 
relation to each other and/or the enemy in order to use their full potentialities" 
(JP1-02, 1994: 452).  In order to consistently identify the "ordered arrangement 
and maneuvers" of an IW weapon system, when used within this research, 
tactics will describe, as a bare minimum, an effect point, the level of effect of 
deny, degrade, disrupt, and destroy, and the parameters to consider. Other 
specific considerations may also be incorporated. 
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Platform. Although referred to within the US Intelligence Targeting Guide, 
delivery platform is not specifically defined in the applicable literature. The 
definition used in this study is that a platform is the equipment, system, signal, or 
person used to transport the product or action to the intended target. 
Payload or Munition. Munition has several meanings, dependent upon 
one's view of the battlespace. In its most restricted meaning, it is just another 
word for ordnance. With the above definition in mind and a focus on the 10 
planner, payload can be defined as the active agent or effect mechanism. 
2.6   The Information Warfare Battlespace 
A battlespace is defined as, 'The commander's conceptual view of 
the area and factors, which he must understand to apply combat 
power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It 
encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and 
information operations." 
AFDD 1 AF Basic Doctrine, 1997 (79) 
Analysis of a battlespace can be described in four elements; aerospace, 
surface, information, and the human dimension. Three of the four elements can 
be further divided, respectively into sub-elements of air and space, land and sea, 
and data, systems, and functions (AF IPB, 1999: 5). 
Since the release of AFDD 1 in 1997, there has been a further 
formalization and decomposition of a battlespace for information by the 
identification of components of information and information systems (AFDD 2-5, 
1998: 2). In comparison, at the joint level, the battlespace is described as human 
factors, links, and nodes. 
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The human factors are those affecting human decision processes. 
The links are the information and information systems used to 
support decision-making. The nodes are those information and 
information systems used to process information and implement 
decisions. 
JP3-13, 1998:11-13 
Another decomposition exists of the battlespace where individual 
attributes are quantifiable, operational, and understandable (Doyle, 1998: 31). 
This decomposition was first introduced by Capt Michael P. Doyle in 1998. He 
applied a Value Focused Thinking approach to the information realm, which was 
divided into information, information based processes, and information systems. 
Two hierarchies, Figure 2- 6 and Figure 2- 7, resulted from his study. They are 
called the Value Hierarchy for the Information Realm and Objective Hierarchy for 
Offensive IO, respectively. The value hierarchy decomposed the information 
realm to reflect the fundamental objectives and values of the decision maker 
(Doyle, 1998:3-1). 
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The Information Realm 
(That Part That Affects Politico-Military Decision Making) 
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Source: Capt Michael Doyle, AFIT Thesis, 1998 
Figure 2- 6. Value Hierarchy for the Information Realm 
Applying the objectives of offensive IO to the value hierarchy developed 
the second product. The resulting hierarchy applied a consistent view of 
objectives of offensive actions, which attacked and removed value from these 








































































Source: Capt Michael Doyle, AFIT Thesis, 1998. 
Figure 2- 7. Objective Hierarchy for Offensive IO 
In addition to the attributes, the costs of employing an action must also be 




















Source: Capt Michael Doyle, AFIT Thesis, 1998. 
Figure 2- 8. Cost Hierarchy for Offensive IO 
Another aspect that makes these hierarchies valuable is the associated 
measures of effectiveness. Appropriate measures of effectiveness attributes 
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were developed for each attribute and costs. These were developed with 10 and 
operational experts from the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (now 
the Joint Information Operations Center) and US Special Forces Command. 
Each measure identifies a tangible measurement that can be used to assess an 
effect upon the identified and appropriate attribute. 
Value Focused Thinking is a decision analysis approach that requires the 
decomposition of an environment to a consistent, non-repeatable, and 
operational level where actual single dimension measures can be determined 
and used. Capt Doyle's decomposition and resulting hierarchies and measures 
of effectiveness are presented as the basis for further refinement and the 
identification of the IW battlespace. The use of a modified objective hierarchy will 
be presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Modifications were made to 
accommodate a refocusing of the 10 primary goal at the operational and tactical 
levels of operation. 
2.7   Combat Assessment Concepts 
"The time to begin thinking about assessment is before mission execution, 
not afterwards" (AFP 14-210, 1998: 67). Combat assessment is an on-going, 
dynamic feedback activity that evaluates combat operations effectiveness in 
achieving objectives. A comparison of the action's results to the objectives 
determines mission success or failure and drives current and future targeting 
decisions. This type of assessment is also required for offensive IW actions. 
There are three sub-assessment types used for traditional weapon systems 
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called Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), Mission Assessment (MA), and 
Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) (AFP 14-210,1998: 30-31). 
2.7.1   Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 
"BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from 
the application of military force, either lethal or non lethal, against a 
predetermined objective. It can be applied to all types of weapon 
systems and through out the range of military operations." 
AFP 14-210, 1998:71 
To be effective, BDA must be tailored to the decision makers. The 
traditional BDA is further broken down into three lower level assessment types, 
Physical Damage, Functional Damage, and Target System Assessment. 
Physical Damage Assessment. This assessment is a post attack, target 
analysis and estimation of the extent of physical damage to the target (AFP 14- 
210,1998:71). 
Functional Damage. Functional damage takes into account and estimates 
the remaining functional or operational capability of an object or facility. This 
type of assessment is usually inferred from the assessments of physical damage. 
(AFP 14-210, 1998:71) 
Target System Assessment. A target system, as defined earlier includes 
all targets that are functionally related within a particular geographic area or any 
group of related targets that will produce a particular effect if destroyed (AFP 14- 
210,1998:18). A target system assessment is an estimation of the overall 
impact against the system (AFP 14-210,1998: 72). 
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2.7.2  Mission Assessment (MA) 
This type of assessment addresses the effectiveness of operations of a 
type of mission. For example, some of the types of missions are those of 
interdiction, counterair, or maritime support. Although assessment is usually 
concerned with the cumulative damage to targets, mission assessment is more 
concerned with the effectiveness of the overall mission upon enemy activities. 
"The mission is successful if the enemy is reacting as intended (AFP 14-210, 
1998:75). 
2.7.3   Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) 
Munitions Effectiveness Assessment is concerned with both munitions 
data and platform delivery conditions. It is a performance-based assessment 
that compares the expected performance to the actual performance (AFP 14- 
210,1998:74). 
2.8   The Operational Environment Assessment Model 
A model was built to accommodate the key factors and constraints 
identified during an initial environment assessment. The model is a combination 
of several different techniques common in business management. The approach 
combines an overall customer oriented and process focus from business re- 
engineering, the identification of the research object's characteristics of mission 
and its surrounding environment is incorporated from strategic management, and 
guidelines to identify tangible deliverables and activities are included from basic 
planning steps. 
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The overall model encompasses a focus on the customer and process. 
For example, the research would always revert to focusing on a process and 
attempting to determine what inputs were needed in order to achieve the desired 
outputs that were required or had value to the customer (Hammer, 1993: 35). 
In order to understand the current state of the IO planner's organization, 
three key components were included within the model to ensure a 
comprehensive exploration. The first two components were the mission, and the 
external and internal environments being studied. The third component was 
made up of defining and identifying applicable deliverables, activities, and 
events. The model is graphically depicted below in Figure 2- 9. 
V,&Eyents ,. -' J 
Figure 2- 9. The Operational Environment Assessment Model 
The two aspects borrowed from Hammer and Champy's text, 
Reenginnering the Corporation, are customer and process focus. Customer 
focus is maximizing customer satisfaction and is the overall goal.   All decisions 
should be focused upon the affects it will have upon the customer. 
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Process focus is creating an output of value to the customer. This means 
that processes should be organized around outcomes, not tasks and must not be 
built around assumptions or any underlying beliefs (Hammer, 1993:144). It is 
also important to define a process as a collection of activities that take one or 
more kinds of input and creates an output that is of value to the customer 
(Hammer, 1993: 35). Individual tasks within a process do not matter if the overall 
process is unable to deliver the goods (Hammer, 1993: 35). These two factors 
are the underlying basis of this research model. 
The three key components to assess a unit's current status were 
incorporated from Pearce and Robinson's text on Strategic Management. 
Mission is the fundamental, unique purpose of an organization that sets the 
scope of its operations (Pearce, 1988: 52). The mission of an organization 
should identify the principal product or service areas and primary customer 
needs to be satisfied. Understanding one's mission can clearly chart future 
direction and establish a basis for organizational decision-making (Goodstein, 
1993: 20).  When formulating its mission, an organization must answer four basic 
questions. 
Table 2- 4. Questions to Ask during Mission Formulation 
Mission Formulation—Questions to Answer 
Generic Questions 
1. What function(s) does the organization perform? 
2. For whom does the organization perform this function? 
3. How does the organization go about filling this function? 
4. Why does this organization exist? 
Source: Goodstein, 1993: 17-18 
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Mission formulation within strategic management planning involves the 
development of an organizational mission statement. Although the purpose of 
the research was not to formulate a mission statement, the guidance given is 
used to determine the unit's mission through doctrine, guidance, literature review, 
informal interviews, and observations. 
In addition, to identifying the mission of the IW Flight, a review of the 
external and internal environments is necessary to identify concerns that may 
affect the organization (Goodstein, 1993: 11). Strategic management planning 
practices attempt to identify environmental items concerning industry, 
government, competition, and economic, political, social, and technological 
aspects. 
The internal environment is important in acquiring knowledge about ones 
own internal structure, culture, climate, productivity, distinctive strengths and 
weaknesses (Goodstein, 1993:121).  In most cases, as the different areas of an 
organization are explored, a more detailed look is needed. These details are 
labeled deliverables, activities, and events. A deliverable is something that will 
be handed over to someone when the effort is completed. This puts the goal and 
objective in a tangible form (Kelley, 1988: 24). Failure to define and agree upon 
the deliverable(s) can result in an array of non-focused activity by the members 
of the organization and often leading to an inability to accomplish the goal. Not 
defining a tangible deliverable can lead to major disasters because no one is 
able to assess if the planned actions would result in achieving the goal. 
2-29 
Once the deliverables are agreed upon, activities and events and their 
relationship to the deliverables must be defined. As Kelley wrote, if the step of 
defining a tangible deliverable is ignored, there will be no way of knowing 
whether doing an activity will result in achieving the desired goal (Kelley, 1988: 
25). Activities or events are those things that are required to create the 
deliverables. It is an action that produces a tangible goal or deliverable (Kelley, 
1988: 25). 
The general model described above was developed to accommodate the 
characteristics and the problem being studied. It is a combination of a variety of 
business management techniques taken from business re-engineering, strategic 
management, and basic planning.   It is used to conduct and guide the research 
through data collection and comparative analysis. 
2.9   Summary 
This review covered an array of topics in order to present a reference 
point when reviewing the next two chapters; Methodology and the proposed IW 
Planning Process. This has provided many definitions that have been overtaken 
by the way we conduct war in an Information Age. At the operational and tactical 
levels of operations, most current practices and publications are built around the 
employment of traditional kinetic weapon systems. This poses a significant 
problem when doctrine and other high-level directives mandate integration of 
offensive IW capabilities into the current organizations. 
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In order to incorporate offensive IW as a primary weapon option into the 
Aerospace Operations Center, the 10 community will have to conform to the 
desires and needs of its customer, the AOC. 
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3    Methodology 
3.1    Research Process 
This chapter describes the overall methodology used to conduct, guide, 
and assess the results of this research. It first outlines and identifies key factors 
concerning the research object and the constraints of the operational 
environment that dictated this research methodology.   It then presents a model 
that was developed to identify the steps required to answer the research 
question, "How can offensive IW be integrated within the AF as a primary 
weapon option".   In order to manage the many facets of this research, the 
research was categorized into five stages, each being the basis for the next 
phase. These stages are identified below. 
Stage 0—Initial Assessment of the Research Environment 
Stage I—Determination of the External Environment 
Stage II—Process Development 
Stage III—Assessment of the Developed Process 
Stage IV—Analysis of Findings 
The chapter contains a description of the model and each stage of 
the research. Table 3- 4, located at the end of the chapter, 
summarizes Stages 1-4, the data collection type, and the research 
results. 
3.2   Stage 0—Baselining the Initial Research Environment 
In order to perform a comprehensive analysis of the inputs of the AF IO 
community, several important factors were identified through an initial literature 
review and informal interviews. The initial research environment included the 
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identification of the primary and secondary research objects, the problem 
statement, and the environmental constraints and assumptions. The findings are 
summarized in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1. Initial Environment Assessment 
Who or What Position or Affect within 
Environment 






Problem How to integrate offensive 
IW within the current 
environment 
Accomplishment of mission of IO 
Planner 
Constraints/Assumptions IO Planner is a part of the 
AOC 
No guidance on HOW to be part 
of AOC 
IO Planner must work 
within AOC environment 
IO Planner should conform to 
the given environment 
IO Planner is the expert of 
new capability (IIW and 
IW) 
New capability not explicitly 
defined 
From this initial assessment, it became clear that the focus of research 
was on the IO Planners and their performance within the Aerospace Operations 
Center (AOC). As in any research environment, several constraints also became 
apparent. These constraints were that the IO Planner must conform to the AOC 
environment and that expert knowledge of IW capabilities was expected. This 
initial assessment of the problem statement and constraints also dictated a 
qualitative research methodology that was flexible and allowed for a continuous 
evolution of comparisons and analysis. In order to maintain study boundaries 
and give structure to the research effort, the operational environment 
assessment model was developed and used in Stage 0. 
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3.2.1   The Operational Environment Assessment Model 
A model was built to accommodate the key factors and constraints 
identified during the initial assessment. The model is a combination of several 
different techniques common in business management. The approach combines 
an overall customer orientation and process focus from business re-engineering. 
The identification of the research object's characteristics of mission and its 
surrounding environment is incorporated from strategic management. The 
simple identification guidelines of tangible deliverables and activities come from 
basic planning steps. 
Three key components are used to assess a unit's current status.    These 
components are the unit's mission, it's environment (external and internal), and 
the applicable deliverables, activities, and events of the organization (Goodstein, 
1993:17-18). These key components are incorporated into the environment 
assessment model, which is depicted below in Figure 3-1. 
-^&^Events ^ J 
Figure 3-1. The Operational Environment Assessment Model 
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Customer and process focus are the two underlying factors of this 
research model. In addition to being used in Stage 0, this customer and process 
focus is continuously used and applied throughout the research to ensure the 
overall data collection, comparisons, and analysis was properly focused on the 
customer, the AOC. 
When formulating its mission, Goodstein suggests, an organization must 
answer four basic questions. Table 3-2 outlines both the generic and IW Flight 
specific questions used in this research. 
Table 3- 2. A Summary of Mission Formulation Questions 
Mission Formulation—Questions to Answer 
Generic Questions IW Flight Questions 
1 What function(s) does the organization 
perform? 
What is the stated vision and mission of 
the Flight? 
2 For whom does the organization 
perform this function? 
Who are their customers? 
3 How does the organization go about 
filling this function? 
How does the Flight accomplish this 
function? 
4 Why does this organization exist? Is there a reason for the Flight to exist? 
Why? 
Source: Adopted from Goodstein, 1993:17-18 
In addition to asking these questions in an attempt to determine the 
mission of the IW Flight, a review of the external and internal environments was 
conducted. This research focused heavily on the external environment of the 
organization in regards to the customer's mission, needs, structure, and decision 
cycles. 
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The internal environment is also important in acquiring knowledge about 
ones own internal structure, culture, climate, productivity, distinctive strengths 
and weaknesses (Goodstein, 1993:121).  Since the IW flights are relatively new, 
internal and individual structures are still being developed. For this reason an 
exploration into the internal workings of the flight was purposely limited at this 
time. It is included in the model as a dotted area to emphasize its importance. 
Once the flights develop further this internal environment should be studied 
before any significant change is implemented. Knowledge about the unit's 
internal culture and weaknesses could help in identifying potential acceptance or 
resistance problems of a policy or vision change of the organization. 
As the different areas of the external environment were explored it 
became clear that a more detailed investigation of these elements was required. 
The model identifies these as the deliverables, activities, and events. Stage I 
attempts to identify the deliverables, activities, and events within the external 
environment affecting the flight. It does this by determining the external 
environment of the flight. 
3.3   Stage I—Determination of the External Environment 
In order to determine a baseline of understanding of the AF IO 
environment, current literature, AF and joint doctrine and guidance helped to 
establish a preliminary overview and were accomplished in Stage 0. This initial 
baseline acted as the starting point for comparison and analysis in an attempt to 
identify the basic elements of the organization; mission, organizational structure, 
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and personnel. As mentioned in the earlier model description, the focus on 
process and customer would help to determine what the unit must do and then 
how to do it. It should ignore "what is" and concentrate on "what should be" 
(Hammer, 1993: 2). 
The next step was to answer two broad questions in order to find out what 
were the deliverables, activities, and events of an IO planner. These questions 
were: 
1. "What decisions or recommendations is the IO planner required to 
make?" 
2. "What are their product deliverables?" 
Each question seemed logical and separate, but after closer investigation, 
they could not be answered without considering the IO Planner's customer, the 
AOC. Focus had to be placed upon the AOC's needs, the AOC's environment, 
and the AOC's decision cycles. Although the literature and guidance explicitly 
stated what the flight's mission and deliverables were, many iterations of data 
collection and comparative analysis were required to reveal a true picture of what 
these components consisted of. The data collection included interviews, a field 
observation at an AOC exercise, as well as reviews of IO and AOC training 
lesson objectives and plans. This investigation resulted in deliverables of target 
nominations, weaponeered targets, and assessment indicators. 
Once these were solidified, several activities and events became apparent 
as required for the production of these deliverables. The first was the knowledge 
requirements needed to be able to develop target nominations, weaponeered 
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targets, and assessment indicators. The second activity or event identified was 
the processes and decision cycles of the AOC. The third activity or event that 
was required was the identification of the process or procedure that would 
produce the outputs or deliverables in a standardized or systematic way. Table 
3- 4, located at the end of this chapter, summarizes the final results of the 
research. 
3.4   Stage II—Process Development 
In order to fill the gap identified in Stage I of the research, the 
development of a process to aid the 10 planner in his or her ability to plan and 
produce the deliverables important within the AOC environment was necessary. 
In addition, the distinction between using 10 as a supporting function to kinetic 
and traditional systems verses a supported and primary option required a slightly 
different view then currently being used. This view dictated a proactive and a 
purely offensive mode, unlike a supporting function, which lends itself to a more 
reactive and defensive role within an offensive situation. 
The research model's focus on the customer and environment continued 
to aid the identification of the contributing and required activities and events to 
the various process requirements. The knowledge requirements and the 
decision cycles within the AOC were the activities and events leading to the 
tangible deliverables of the 10 Planners. The targeting cycle was determined to 
be the correct model to emulate due to its strong presence within the AOC. It 
governed all aspects of the environment and all members were deeply entwined 
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within this process. In addition, each phase of the targeting cycle produced a 
necessary output that could be the basis for further decomposition, aiding in the 
decision making processes of the 10 planner in all phases of planning; long 
range, deliberate, and crisis action. 
The concept that offensive IW must be considered as a primary weapon 
option, within the aerospace focused environment of the AOC, required that the 
10 planner work within the processes of the given environment.    In addition, 
"how" to integrate into the environment was also a basis of concern. These 
concerns were solved by mapping the deliverables of the 10 planner to the 
aerospace and targeting concepts, terms, and decision cycles already present 
and in full use within the AOC. The overall process is presented in Chapter 4. 
3.5   Stage III—Assessment of the Developed Process 
Once a framework with the appropriate and applicable concepts and 
definitions were developed, an initial assessment was essential. Two sets of 
activities were used to assess the usefulness of the concepts derived and the 
process developed. The first set of activities is referred to as the presentation 
and is a briefing presenting the concepts and process to a group of participants. 
It is accompanied with acquiring written individual feedback questionnaires from 
each participant. A copy of the feedback questionnaire is included in Appendix 
C. The group was made up of members from the Air Force Information Warfare 
Center and ranged from senior level managers (group commander) to mid level 
technicians. 
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The second set of activities is referred to as the senior level review. This 
activity included a personal review of a report outlining the background of the 
current environment and the proposed concepts and process. The objective of 
this activity was to attempt to determine, in the participants/reviewer's opinion, 
the usefulness of the concepts and process to the 10 community. The 
participants were chosen by their position and continued involvement with this 
and other research efforts within the 10 community. Participants within this group 
were creators, developers, and extensive users of 10 at the senior level. Review 
questionnaires and interviews of the participants were used for this part of the 
assessment. 
Table 3- 3. Summary of Feedback Objectives 
Presentation Critiques 
Objectives: An initial assessment of 
Usability and Usefulness 
Questions to answer: 
1. Does the process seem useful? 
2. Does the process seem easy to 
use? 
Senior Level Review Critiques 
Objectives: An initial assessment of 
Usefulness within the I0 community 
Questions to answer: 
1. Do you approve or disapprove 
with the process being useful to 
the IO community? 
2. Do you approve or disapprove 
with each concept identified as 
being useful to the IO 
 community?  
A research summary also appears in Table 3- 4, under Stage III and the 
assessment instruments are presented in Appendix C. The instruments include 
briefing slides and feedback questionnaires for both activity levels. 
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Research Extension: During the course of this research it became 
apparent that there were several areas of knowledge required of an 10 planner. 
One of these areas of knowledge; our own Offensive IW capabilities, 
weaknesses, and limitations seemed to be non-existent in any consolidated form. 
This knowledge is a critical and missing piece to Stage II—IW Weaponeering & 
Force Application. In addition, this crucial knowledge area, which equates to 
"know your self, could have implications in every aspect of offensive IW. If this 
knowledge was used proactively and properly, it could drive long range planning, 
weapon development and modification, a proactive and effective defensive 
posture, and even better and more evasive target development. 
This research extension of the process was also performed with a focus 
on its applicability and understanding to further decompose the IW battlespace. 
The goal was to use the concepts in Stage II to decompose the information 
battlespace to a lower and more useable level than the effect point. This 
extension included brainstorming sessions with groups of two to five participants 
from a myriad of disciplines that included students of information security, 
students at the 10 schoolhouse, researchers, and members of the AF Information 
Warfare Center. The session stepped the group through a process of identifying 
weapon or action characteristics (tactics, delivery platforms, and payloads) for 
one of the attributes of the information battlespace. The end result was a list of 
actions that would affect an attribute of the information environment in the 
desired way. In addition, effects assessment indicators were also determined for 
each action identified. 
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Feedback regarding the usefulness of the process and concepts were 
solicited upon completion of the brainstorming session from each participant. A 
comment sheet or "After-Session" questionnaire form was used. The objective 
of the feedback form was to determine if the process presented, was or would be 
usable and useful to identifying types of offensive 10 actions in the opinion of the 
participant. 
3.6   Stage IV—Analysis of Findings 
Analyzing the questionnaire from each activity; presentation and the 
senior level reviews were focused on answering the questions presented in Table 
3- 3. The assessment process consisted of the tabulation and analysis of the 
presentation or senior level review feedback questionnaire by each participant. 
The purpose of this part of the assessment stage was to determine if the 
concepts and process appeared to be useful and usable. 
The presentation questionnaire is broken down into three parts. Part 1 is 
represented by two questions presented with a five-option response. This part is 
used to determine the participant's opinion about the proposed process' usability 
and usefulness. Part 2 and 3 are made up of one question each with identified 
areas to indicate a positive response. In addition, written responses are 
requested to further understand the opinion behind the answer. 
The senior level review questionnaire is broken down into four parts. Part 
1 is represented by 5, five-option response. The participants are asked for either 
approval or disapproval on the process and other identified concepts in regards 
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to its usefulness to the 10 community. Part 2 and 3 are made up of one question, 
each with identified areas to indicate a positive response. In addition, each 
question in Part 2 and 3 allows room for written responses. Part 4 were used to 
solicit "General Comments". These questionnaires were sent out with the report, 
but were not a requirement for a response. 
3.7   Summary 
The research conducted in this study included an initial assessment of the 
10 environment, the development of a research model, grounded research 
methods of data collection and comparative analysis, process development, and 
subject matter expert assessments. In order to systematically progress, the 
research was broken into five stages to allow for the decomposition and analysis 
of the mission, environment, deliverables, and the applicable activities and 
events. Stages 1-4 of the research process are summarized in Table 3- 4. 
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Table 3- 4. Summary of Research—Stage I through Stage IV 
Research Focus Data Collection Type Research Results—Deliverables, 
Activities and Events 
Stage 1—Determination of the External Environment 
Determination of Environment and 
Customer Needs 
Literature Review-Business 
Process Reengineering, Systems 
Analysis, Process Identification, 
Deliverables based on customer 
needs 
Environment 
-NAF and JAOC 
Customer Needs 
-Attainment of objectives thru desired 
effects thru affected targets 
Determination of 10 planner 
decision requirements— 
OPERATIONAL Level of 
Operations 
Literature Review-Joint and Air 
Force Doctrine, Operations 
Concept, Training Plans and 





-Assessment Requirements Field Observations-Blue Flag 
Field Observations-IO Schoolhouse 
Capstone 
Attended-AOC training 
Determination of 10 planner 
knowledge requirements— 
OPERATIONAL Level of 
Operations 
Same as above Knowledge Requirements 
-Battlefield Characteristics 
-Adversary's Characteristics 
-10 Weapon Capabilities 
Determination of applicable 
decision cycles within environment 
of 10 planner— OPERATIONAL 
Level of Operations 
Same as above Decision Cycles/Environment 
-Targeting-Weaponeering Cycle 
-Air Tasking Order Cycle 
-Information Realm (Hierarchies) 
Determination on how to integrate 
definitions/concepts 
Same as above No single standardized process 
Stage II—Process Development 
Develop systematic process 
Goal: Customer focused, useable, 
and useful 
Basis: Targeting Cycle with focus 
on end product deliverables of the 




-Input to feedback 
Stage III—Validation of Process 
Briefing/Presentation 
Validate Developed Process 
Goal: Initial Face Validity 
Semi-Structured Briefing 
Participant: AF Information 
Warfare Center Personnel 
Briefing 
-Background, concepts, definitions 
-Process Breakdown 
Individual Session Feedback 
Objective: Assess opinion upon 
usefulness and usability of 







Validate Developed Process 
Goal: Assess usefulness within 10 
community 
Report Review (Chapter 2) 
Participant: Senior/Mid-Level 
Managers involved in policy 
formulation and implementation of 
10 concepts 
Full Report Review 
-Background, concepts, definitions 
-Process Breakdown 
Review Critiques 
Objective: Assess opinion upon 
the usefulness within the 10 
community 
Critique Results 
-Usefulness within community 
Stage IV—Analysis of Findings 
Analyze Feedback Five option response and Content 
Analysis 
Identify usability and usefulness from 
inputs from individuals                             | 
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4    The Offensive IW Planning Process 
4.1    Introduction 
"In many respects, one can consider information as a realm, just as 
land, sea, air, and space are realms. Information has its own 
characteristics of motion, mass, and topography, just as air, space, 
sea, and land have their own distinct characteristics." 
"Land, sea, air, and space are realms within which we may conduct 
military operations. Each realm imposes its characteristics on 
operations within it. Information and its functions also may host 
military operations, but those operations must conform to the 
characteristics of the information system and its functions." 
Cornerstones, 1995: 8 
This chapter is a synopsis of findings of an exploratory and comparative 
analysis conducted to understand and define the current IO environment at the 
operational level of operations. The research is based upon the premise 
identified by the above statements, that information is a realm, that it holds its 
own characteristics that must conform to the characteristics of the information 
systems and its functions (Cornerstones, 1995: 8). In order for the information 
realm to take shape, this research identifies the IO mission, defines the offensive 
IW mission, identifies its organizational structure and IO planner's deliverables, 
and manpower. It then defines the goal of offensive IW, its target sets, its 
decision environment, and its battlespace. 
The final portion of this chapter is dedicated to giving these concepts and 
definitions a framework by suggesting a useable and useful process, called the 
Offensive IW Planning Process. This process will allow movement and 
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integration of offensive IW as a primary weapon option into the activities of the 
current and given environment of the Air Force. 
4.2   The Mission of Air Force Offensive IW 
The mission to integrate 10, as stated in the AF CONOPS, is a difficult 
task that will require changes within the organizational structure, the mission, the 
personnel, and the process.   The tactical level is where the primary focus is to 
deny, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise control an adversary's use of information (JP 
3-13,1998:11-11). The operational level is where the theater planning of tactical 
execution begins. 
"AF IW efforts will focus on implementing IW capabilities through 
warfighting component commands in support of joint warfighting commands" 
(AFDD 2-5,1998: 7). In addition, IW activities and operations must be integrated 
within the normal campaign planning and execution process, making its 
consideration and use second nature (AFDD 2-5,1998: 7). It must become a 
primary weapon system of consideration and use as a supported, and in 
supporting, the achievement of strategy and objectives at all levels of operations. 
The Air Force's current vision and mission for I0 is to establish and 
maintain information superiority over the adversary and to provide the best 
battlespace information to the right place—anywhere, anytime (AF CONOPS, 
1999: iii).   Offensive IW activities are conducted to control the information 
environment in response to acquiring information superiority, therefore, enabling 
the accomplishment of objectives (AF CONOPS, 1999:1).   Coordination and 
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synchronization of defensive and offensive actions are essential to incorporate 
full spectrum 10 capabilities across the entire battlespace (AF CONOPS, 1999, 
4). The I0 focus upon achieving Information Superiority is apparent and 
explicitly identified within doctrine. 
As in any organization, the mission and vision is the driving force and 
directly contributes to the direction and focus of a unit. The I0 community is no 
different. In order for offensive IW to become a primary weapon option, this 
thesis postulates that offensive IW must refocus its mission upon achieving 
another core competency; Precision Engagement. It must also achieve ... 
"...the ability of forces to locate, surveil, discern, and track 
objectives or targets, select, organize, and use the correct systems; 
generate desired effects: assess results; and reengage with 
decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, 
throughout the full range of military operations." 
Joint Vision 2020, 2000: 28 
Without this mission of achieving Precision engagement, offensive IW will 
always remain as a supporting function to other weapon systems in achieving 
information superiority. 
4.3   The Organizational Structure, The Manpower, and The Deliverables 
The organizational structure of IO at the operational level was set by the 
incorporation of the IW flight embedment within selected MAJCOMs and 
Numbered Air Forces (NAF) across the world. These flights are also the 
specialty teams deployed as members of the Aerospace Operations Center 
(AOC) (AF CONOPS, 1999: 11). The structure, purpose, and mission of the 
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AOC are the driving force on how IW activities can be incorporated into the Air 
Force as a primary weapon option. Incorporation into the AOC's major 
processes is necessary. 
The two major processes found within the AOC are the Air Tasking Order 
(ATO) and targeting cycle processes. Both of these processes integrate 
requirements, capabilities, and efforts of all command levels. 
Figure 4-1 is re-introduced here in order to highlight the importance of the 







Prioritized Target List 
(JIPTL) 
Master Air Attack Plan 
(MAAP) 
Summary of the Targe ting Cycle and Major ATO product deliverables 
Source: 8AF Blue Flag Briefing Slidei. 2000 
Figure 4-1. Targeting cycle and ATO product deliverables 
Analyzing the major processes, the ATO and the targeting cycles helps to 
identify the required IO planner inputs and deliverables into these planning 
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cycles. Figure 4- 2, depicts the phases requiring 10 planner inputs, the specific 
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Figure 4-2.10 Deliverables and Inputs 
As a result of the analysis of the targeting and ATO cycle, the 10 planners 
are directly responsible for three major products; target nominations, weapon 
assignment, and assessment indicators. The first 10 product is target 
nominations, which are the possible target elements that could be affected by an 
offensive action. Targets that are eventually selected are included into the Joint 
Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). The second product is weapon 
assignment. In order to incorporate IW actions into the Master Air Attack Plan 
(MAAP), IW weapons must be assigned to their appropriate targets. The third 
major input by the 10 planner is assessment indicators. These indicators must 
be fed into the intelligence collection requirements system in order to aid in the 
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development of execution results upon completion of the force execution phase 
and commencement of the combat assessment phase. 
In short, the analysis of the AOC's organizational structure and processes 
dictate timing and product requirements from all combat planners. As part of the 
AOC, the 10 planners are directly responsible for the three major products that 
identify IW related resources, which feed into the sub-processes within the ATO 
and targeting cycles. These products are target nominations, weapon 
assignment, and assessment indicators. 
All planners within the AOC must combine intelligence about the 
adversary (threat, target systems, target characteristics) with operations data on 
resource capabilities (force posture, weapon systems and capabilities, weapon 
effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine) in order to accomplish 
proper targeting, application, and execution. (AFP 14-210, 1998: 7)   IW Flight 
members are the IO planners and focal point for planning and employing this 
essential integration of adversary characteristics and friendly capability at the 
AOC level. 
As one reviews the function of the IW Flight in light of offensive IW, it 
becomes apparent the flight is responsible for both deliberate and crisis action 
planning. The differences between these two planning phases are 1) the 
decision time factor and 2) frequency of the changing situation or environment. 
Both deliberate and crisis action planning requires the IO planner to investigate 
possible target sets and target effect points and attempt to match the adversary's 
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vulnerabilities with possible IW capabilities to deny, disrupt, degrade or destroy 
the adversary's use of information. 
As the mission, organizational structure, and players within the equation to 
operationalize offensive AF 10 are defined, the unknown variable, the process, 
becomes an essential missing piece of the successful implementation of 10 into 
the Air Force. 
Before a process can be developed, several other and essential concepts 
and definitions of the information environment must be identified. These 
concepts and definitions must be defined in order to shape a realm in which 
military operations can take place. 
The next section of this chapter will outline a number of definitions and 
concepts, in order to lay a foundation enabling the "how" to take place within the 
current AF structure. 
4.4   The Definitions, Concepts, and Foundation 
As the AF 10 mission, organizational structure, its players, and their 
deliverables are defined, the unknown variable, the process, becomes an 
essential piece of the successful implementation of IO into the Air Force. 
Before a process can be developed several other essential concepts and 
definitions of the information environment must be identified. These concepts 
and definitions must be defined in order to shape a realm in which military 
operations can take place. This next section of this chapter will outline a number 
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of definitions and concepts, in order to lay a foundation enabling the "how" to 
take place within the current AF structure. 
In the process of uncovering important variables, it has also identified 
several important factors not explicitly or clearly outlined. These factors are 
defined or clarified in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1. Summary of Definitions 
Terms Brief Definitions 
Primary Offensive IW Goal 
Tactical Level of Operations 
Affecting the information factors of the 
decisions of the adversary to achieve the 
desired effect 
Information, Information Systems, 
Information Based Processes (13) 
Target sets that can be devalued and affect 
quality of information 
Decision Environment Information factors are inputs into decisions 
which lead to an end result or effect 
IW Battlespace The environment where military IW 
operations can take place. The basis of it 
consist of 13 and effect points 
Although the table lists the basic definitions of each of the terms used 
within this research, the following section will define and clarify key factors that 
will be needed to understand some of the reasons behind the process. 
4.5   The Primary Offensive IW Objective and Target Set Determination 
As mentioned in the previous section, offensive IW actions should focus 
on the manipulation or destruction of information in order to support efforts to 
affect the desired strategic, operational, and tactical objectives or effects. 
Several US documents point to the human as the main target in IO. Joint 
Vision (JV) 2020 states that the ultimate target of information operations is the 
human decision maker (JV 2020, 2000: 36). The joint publication for Information 
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Operations goes further stating; offensive 10 involves capabilities and activities to 
affect adversary decision-makers and to achieve specific objectives (JP 3-13, 
1998: viii). In addition, offensive IW can target three areas; human decision 
processes (human factors), information and information systems used to support 
decision making (links), and information and information systems used to 
process information and implement decisions (nodes) (JP 3-13,1998:11-13). JV 
2020 warns that it will be equally necessary to understand the complete realm of 
Command and Control (C2) decision making, the nature of organizational 
collaboration, and especially the "human in the loop" (JV 2020, 2000: 38). 
If the mission and focus of IO is on the end result, one can work 
backwards to the decision maker and find the most important area acting upon 
the end results is the decisions made by the decision maker. Although 
attempting to understand the decision-maker and his or her decision-making 
process is an important variable, the real concerns are the decisions that result in 
effects. In addition, focusing on the decision maker and his or her decision- 
making process narrows the actions that can affect the decision maker without 
regard for other very important and potentially more accessible targets. 
At the operational and tactical level of war, understanding the decision- 
maker and his or her decision making process is a difficult task. JP 3-13 states 
that, "the primary focus of offensive IO at this level is to deny, disrupt, destroy, or 
otherwise control an adversary's use of information and information systems" (JP 
3-13,1998:11-11). The difference between focusing on the decision versus the 
decision maker can be academic, but a difference can exist if at the operational 
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level the 10 planner lacks sufficient intelligence data to extrapolate to what can 
and does affect the decisions and the overall effect.   The danger is if the target 
is the decision-maker and/or his decision making process, the tendency to forget 
the true desired effect and it's associated decision is easily manifested. 
This thesis assumes that the overall offensive IW goal is to affect the 
information factors of the desired decisions of the adversary in order to achieve 
the desired effects within the area of interest. With this objective several target 
sets become available. These target sets are the information realm, the 
decision-maker, and the decision-makers decision-making process. It is 
important to note that there are two opportunities to affect the information realm. 
The first is the information realm that makes up the inputs into the decision 
maker and decision making process. The second realm disseminates the 
outputs (decisions) of the decision maker and decision making process back into 
the organization. All of these target sets have one thing in common; all are 
affected by the quality of its information, information systems, and information 
based processes. 
Figure 4- 3 illustrates the possible target sets that affect the desired effect. 
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Movement towards the Decision & Effect 
IW Strategy—Induce Desired Decisions or the Dissemination of the Decisions 
to Achieve Desired Effects 
Figure 4- 3. 10 Target Sets 
Although the distinctions between the target sets of the information realm 
and the decision maker and the decision making process may seem 
inconsequential at first glance, they do provide for different offensive actions and 
tangible assessment measures. For these reasons, the suggested process 
focuses on affecting the information realm, which defines the target set, the 
components, and attributes of the environment. 
4.6   Determination of the IW Battles pace 
The determination of the IW Battlespace is built around a decision 
environment concept presented in this next section. The basis of this concept is 
that the decision is affected by the quality of information or information factors 
required, presented, and accepted by the different levels of decision-makers. 
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Therefore, it is the objective of offensive IW, at the tactical level of 
operations, to affect or devalue the quality of information or information factors 
received from the processes and systems used by the adversary as inputs into 
the decision or as the decisions are disseminated back out into the organization. 
Figure 4- 4 illustrates the decision environment of an adversary. 
Decision Environment 
Information Factors    * Desired Decision     *" Information Factors     *■ Desired Effect 
Figure 4- 4. Decision Environment 
In order to affect the information factors of the decision environment is 
through the Information Realm target set. The only widely accepted doctrine and 
guidance of the information realm is to the component level of Information, 
Information Systems, and Information Based Processes (13) (JP 3-13,1998: vii). 
For the purpose of presenting offensive IW as a primary weapon option, this 
breakdown of the information realm must be further decomposed. 
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The decomposition used as the basis for defining the IW battlespace is a 
model developed by Capt Michael P. Doyle to represent the information realm 
called the Value Hierarchy for the Information Realm. It also incorporates a costs 
hierarchy. The models are based on value-focused thinking, a decision analysis 
approach. It is the representation of value attributes of the information realm that 
is complete, nonredundant, understandable, and operational. (Doyle, 1998: 3-9) 
As offensive IW objectives are applied to devalue the quality of the information 
received by the decision-maker, the model transforms into an Objectives 
Hierarchy for Offensive IO and cost objectives (Doyle, 1998: 3-10). These 
hierarchies were referenced in Chapter 2. 
Capt Doyle's models depict the Information Realm to a level where 
information can now be affected. The IO planner can now focus in on the 
adversary's effect points that will affect the information received and required to 
make a decision. The decomposition presented within this realm; Information, 
Information Systems, and Information Based Processes and its associated 
attributes are suitable as the basis for target set and effect point identification and 
the beginning of the formation of an IW Battlespace. 
Several modifications have been incorporated in order to simplify some of 
the original terms presented in Capt Doyle's study. In addition, the original 
models were not developed to be used as proposed here; therefore, some 
modifications were required to align the model with the purpose of this process. 
Asterisks are used to signify a significant change to the original model. Simple 
rewording does not signify a change to the model, just a clarification and are not 
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identified. The proposed IW Battlespace that includes the 13 target set and effect 
points are illustrated in Figure 4- 5. 
IW Battlespace 
Attack Information Realm 
Information. IntoniwHon Sjntwn, Iran nwlion BMWI PTOCMMS 
...Target Sets 
Attack Information Attack Information Systems Attack Information Based Processes 
Increase Info Needed for Awareness 
Devalue/Increase Age of Information 
Reduce Bdetty of Information 





Reduce Rdetty of System 
j       Decrease Completeness of Message 
4' 
Increase Error Content of Message 
Attack Efficiency 
Increase Consumption of Essential Resources 
13 
Increase Consumption of Essential Time 
14 
Attack Effectiveness 
Decrease Completeness of Message 
8 
Defeat Security 
Increase Recovery Rate of System 
M 9 
Defeat Overall Security of System 
Reduce Timeliness of Process 
15 
Reduce Accuracy of Process 
16 
Reduce Focus on Process 
17 
Reduce Resilience of Process 
18 
Defeat Physical Hardness 
10 
I Defeat Security Measures and Processes 
! 11 
Defeat Detection System 
12- 
...Effect Points 
Figure 4- 5. Proposed IW Battlespace—Target Sets and Effect Points 
In order to complete the information realm, the costs objectives identified 
by Capt Doyle are also included (Doyle, 1998) and illustrated in Figure 4- 6. 
When attempting to minimize cost brought about by target selection and 
weaponeering, all aspects described here should be considered. In addition, a 
financial cost may also be imposed upon the decision. 
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Information Realm 
Offensive IW C ost O bjectives 
Minimize Cost 
Minimize Friendly 
Personnel at Risk 
Consider the relative risk of injury or death 
Maintain Sensitive 
Information Security 
Consider cost and probability of losing system 
Maximize Weapon 
System Survivability 




Consider costs and effects of colateral damage 
Figure 4- 6. Offensive IW Cost Objectives 
Another important piece of Capt Doyle's Value Focused Thinking models 
of offensive 10 objectives and cost are the associated measures of effectiveness 
identified for each value and cost attribute (Doyle, 1998). These associated 
measures of effectiveness are summarized in Table 4- 2, with the appropriate 
modifications. All of the models are used within the proposed process as a 
means of identifying possible offensive actions and their appropriate effects 
assessment indicators (EAIs). 
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Table 4- 2. Measures of Effectiveness of Attributes and Costs 
Defined 
Objective 








1 Increase amount of 
Information needed for 
awareness 
Manipulate & destroy information 
needed 
Level of support required to 
maintain awareness level 
Category User-level Maintenance Level 
2 Increase Age of Information Manipulate & destroy updates Number of change cycles since 
update 
Quantity 0 5 
3* Increase Error Content of 
Message 
Manipulate & destroy content of 
message 
Relative amount of meaning 
retained 
Category No Change No Meaning 
Retained 
4* Decrease Completeness of 
Message 
Manipulate & destroy completeness of 
message 
Percentage of Error Content Percentage 0 100 
5 Reduce Bandwidth Manipulate & destroy available 
bandwidth 
Relative Level of Bandwidth 
available 
Category No Change Deny Flow 
6 Reduce Throughput Manipulate & destroy available 
throughput 
Relative Level of Throughput 
available 
Category No Change Stop Flow 
7 Increase Error Content 
Imposed by System 
Manipulate & destroy content of 
message corrected by system 
Percentage of Error Content Percentage 0 100 
8 Decrease Completeness of 
Message Imposed by System 
Manipulate A destroy completeness of 
message corrected by system 
Relative amount of meaning 
retained 
Category No Change No Meaning 
Retained 
9 Increase Recovery Time Manipulate & destroy recovery time of 
system 
Change Cycles over which the 
System is unable to perform 
Quantity 0 5 
10 Penetrate Physical System Manipulate & destroy physical hardness 
of system 
Level of Defeat effected Category No Capability Completely 
Defeated 
11 Defeat Security Measures 
and Processes 
Manipulate & destroy measures and 
processes 
Likelihood of gaining access to 
system 
Probablity No Change High Probablity 
ir Defeat Detection System Manipulate & destroy detection system Expected Abilty to Defeat 
Adversary's Intrusion Detection 
Category Certainty of 
Desired Effect 
Low Likelihood of 
Desired Effect 
13 Increase Consumption of 
Essential Resources 
Manipulate & destroy essential 
resources 
Percentage of Essential 
Resources Consumed 
Percentage 0 100 
14 Increase Consumption of 
Essential Time 
Manipulate & destroy essential time 
required 
Percentage of Essential Time 
Consumed 
Percentage 0 100 
15 Reduce Timeliness of 
Process 
Manipulate & destroy change cydes Number of change cycles that the 
processed product is late 
Quantity 0 3 
16 Reduce Accuracy of Process Manipulate & destroy accuracy of 
process 
Percentage of Degradation to 
Process'Accuracy 
Percentage 0 100 
17 Reduce Focus on Process Manipulate & destroy focus of process Expected Ability to Redirect 
Process 
Category No Change Completely 
Redirected 
18 Reduce Resilience of 
Process 
Manipulate & destroy adaptability and 
recovery of process 
Expected AbiHy to Reduce 
Process Adaptability and Recovery 
Category No Change Complete Failure 
C1 Minimize Risk to Friendly 
Personnel 
Relative Level of Risk Percentage 0 100 
C2 Minimize Sensitive 
Information Security 
Expected Level of Proliferation Percentage 0 100 
C3 Minimize Weapon System 
SurvivaMity 
Expected Probability of Survival Probablity 0 1 
C4 Mnimize Collateral Damage    I Expected Level of Collateral 
Damage 
Percentage 0 100 
Source: Capt Michael P. Doyle, AFIT Thesis, 1998. 
Affecting the information factors within the decision environment of the 
adversary is the basis for using the information realm as the starting point for the 
formation of the IW Battlespace.   The further decomposition suggested by Capt 
Doyle solidifies the use of the information realm and the associated attributes 
and costs as the right environment. 
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4.7   The IW Planning Process 
In addition, to the overall goal of offensive IW and working within the given 
organizational structure of the AOC forces the requirement to work within the 
targeting and ATO cycles. The proposed process incorporates the two cycles 
and aids in the delivery of the required products and inputs as outlined earlier. 
The suggested process is an attempt to set a standardized framework for 
use within the AF IW community in respect to offensive actions. Its purpose is to 
offer the commander a baseline capability of an AF 10 planner without regard to 
experience and personality.   The process also offers assurance of a 
standardized "all options explored" analysis of the information battlespace. 
The process was developed with regard to the organizational structure 
and process cycles within the AOC and with the AF IW Flight members as its 
user. It is well understood that specific operational details, when employing 
offensive IW capabilities, will be dictated by theatre specific characteristics and 
situational circumstances. 
The intent of this proposed process is to use the process in both phases of 
planning; deliberate and crisis action. 
The suggested process rebundles the steps of the targeting cycle affected 
and controlled by the 10 planner and forces him or her to focus on producing 
products tied to the major milestones and deliverables required within these 
planning cycles. The process is made up of four phases; Effects Based Target 
Development, IW Weaponeering and Force Application, Force Execution, and IW 
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Combat-Assessment Analysis. Figure 4- 7, illustrates the four areas the process 
covers and the desired end products or deliverables. This process has been 
reviewed at each of its phases of development by a number of IO/IW experts. 
Their comments and inputs have been used to refine the process. 
Effects Based Target Development 
IW Weaponeering & Force Application 
IW Combat-Assessment Analysis 
Figure 4- 7. The Suggested Process—Operational Level of Operations 
The next section of this chapter will discuss the different phases of the 
proposed process. It attempts to present a simple, systematic, and 
comprehensive process that would eventually become second nature to all 10 
planners at the operational level of operations. 
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4.7.1   The Effects Based Target Development Phase 
The effects based target development phase combines the first two steps 
of the targeting cycle; Objectives/Guidance and Target Development with the IW 
deliverables of aimpoints (target nominations) and the desired effects. 







• Desired effects in support of 
strategies and objectives 
Target Set Consideration 
• How can you affect the 
Decision thru 13 
Aimpoint Identification 
• Analyze Aimpoint Effects 
•ID Intel Needed 
Aimpoints and Desired Effects 
Weaponeering & Force Application 
Force Execution 
IW Combat-Assessment Analysis 
Figure 4- 8. Phase I—Effects Based Target Development 
In this phase, all steps should be performed at all levels of operations; 
strategic, operational, and tactical without regard to the weapon system to be 
used. The objective is to determine the desired decision and the desired effect 
upon the adversary and determine the target set and effect point that will result in 
the desired effect. 
As an IW focus is applied to this phase, the underlying assumptions, as 
presented earlier are summarized below. 
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1. The objective of offensive IW is to affect the information in order to 
induce a desired decision, therefore achieving the desired effect. 
2. Decisions are affected by the quality of information factors received, 
accepted, and disseminated by the adversary. 
3. Target sets are associated with the information realm components of 
information, information based processes, and information systems. 
4. Target effect points are associated with the information realm value 
attributes. 
With the information realm representing the IO planner's battlespace or 
environment of operations, planners should identify the possible effects to these 
target sets that may support the stated strategy and objectives. 
Once it is determined which component of the IW Battlespace can 
possibly be attacked to accomplish the desired effect, then effect point 
identification analysis would commence.   Initially, the process is performed to 
identify single actions (non-synergistic combinations) with the reasoning of trying 
to understand the effects for each attribute when attacked by a certain weapon 
capability. This helps to better identify simple solutions and lead to only those 
actions needing to be combined in an attempt to get a synergistic effect. 
The recommended sequence of analysis is to identify all components of 13 
that would lend itself to being attacked, resulting with the desired decision and 
effect.   Once the components were identified, possible effect points would then 
be analyzed. This is done by isolating each value attribute within the appropriate 
component and determining if affecting or devaluing the attribute would/could has 
the desired effect upon the decision. 
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After identifying all the possible attributes that could have the desired 
effect upon the information realm, the next step would be to apply an initial 
feasibility assessment. If performed within the deliberate planning phase, this 
could identify possible intelligence requirements gaps needed to affect this 
specific attribute and further identify specific aimpoints available. In addition, 
new or modified weapon capability requirements for the theatre could also be 
identified. 
The following are some of the possible questions a feasibility assessment 
might wish to answer. The purpose of the assessment is to identify the shortfalls 
as well as eliminate the obvious, unfeasible aimpoints. 
Weapon Characteristic Requirements: 
1. How persistent does the weapon have to be to accomplish the desired 
effect? 
2. How precise does the weapon have to be to accomplish the desired 
effect? 
3. Do we have the required capability? 
4. Can we modify a current weapon or obtain the capability? 
Information/Intelligence Requirements: 
1. What type of information/intelligence is needed to ensure the desired 
effect? 
2. What type of information/intelligence is needed to ensure its precision? 
3. Can we acquire the needed information? 
Risk Management Assessment Requirements: 
1. How complex is the action of attacking this particular aimpoint? 
2. What's the probability of success/failure? 
3. What's the impact if the attack fails? 
4. Does the impact (criticality/cost) of failure outweigh the possible 
benefits of the action? 
Although this phase can be tedious, it is critical. It also sets the stage for 
the rest of the process. Through the use of the IW Battlespace, identifying 
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possible effect points and then the specific target and its aimpoint to achieve the 
desired effects, allows the planner to analyze the weaponeering phase better and 
helps in identifying possible, probable, and observable indicators of action 
success or failure. 
Before moving forward, a word of caution is necessary. It is necessary to 
avoid the temptation to jump to a solution before applying all offensive IW 
capabilities to each attribute, especially during deliberate planning. 
Systematically going through this phase can help to identify any shortfalls in 
intelligence and capabilities, and potentially identifying possibilities normally not 
considered. 
The desired effect and selected IW target aimpoints are then passed to 
the next phase; IW Weaponeering and Force Application. 
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4.7.2  IW Weaponeering and Force Application Phase 
Effects Based Target Development 
Weapon Characteristics 
* Weapon System 
"Delivery Method ind Platform 
 •Paylojd 
Level of Effect 
• Manipulate & Destroy 
<0 
Parameters to Consider 
 -T202C  
Measures of Effectiveness 
■ Attack upon Effect point 
[k Effects Assessment Indicators • Triggers/Flags/Activities to watch to assess «■■"•■"« " failure A 
Figure 4- 9. Phase II—IW Weaponeering & Force Application 
The IW Weaponeering & Force Application phase matches weapon 
resources and capabilities to target vulnerabilities in order to achieve the desired 
level of effect. Analyzing each effect point and selected aimpoint, one weapon at 
a time, helps to focus on determining which possible capabilities are available 
and in identifying synergistic combinations later in the process.   The two steps 
within this phase are broken down into areas needing consideration or decisions. 
The first step is identifying weapon characteristics of the chosen weapon system. 
Some of the weapon characteristics have already been identified in the previous 
phase and need to be incorporated here. 
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To be able to identify the weapon resource that could possibly be used, 
there are elements of a weapon system that must be considered. These 
elements can be categorized into three areas; weapon system, delivery 
characteristics, and payload.   These categories are aligned closely with normal 
weaponeering concepts, but are presented here with an IW focus. In addition, 
Table 4- 3 defines several terms as used within this research and suggested 
process. 
1. Weapon System 
What is the specific product or action? 
a. The specific offensive IW pillar—PSYOPS, deception, physical 
attack, electronic warfare, and information attack. 
2. Delivery Characteristics 
This is made up of two sub-categories 
a.  Delivery Methods 
How are we going to perform the action? 
1. Attributes or Aimpoints 
2. Level of Effect 
i.   Manipulate (Deny, Degrade, Disrupt) 
ii.   Destroy 
3. Parameters to Consider (T2Q2C) 
i.   Timing 
When and for how long do you need the action to take 
place or the weapon to perform? 
ii.  Time 
Is it time sensitive? Does it have to occur in a certain 
order or at a specific time? 
iii. Quality 
What degree of precision is needed from the weapon? 
Consider levels of effect as well as inherent weapon 
capabilities and characteristics. 
iv. Quantity 
What degree of persistence is needed from the weapon? 
Consider aimpoint characteristics as well as desired 
effects. 
v.  Cost Attributes 
What will be the associated costs (cost objectives 
introduced earlier) of deploying this weapon? 
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b. Platform 
With what are we going to do this action? What will transport 
the "effect" to the target? 
i.  Equipment 
ii.  Manpower 
3.  Payload or Munitions Characteristics 
What will create the desired and appropriate effect? What is required 
to give us the effect we are seeking? 
Table 4- 3. IW Weaponeering & Force Application Terms 
Terms Definitions 
Method This covers "how" the system will be used. 
This would include the attribute selected, 
level of effect and the appropriate and 
applicable parameters to consider 
Platform The equipment, system, or person used to 
transport the product or action to the 
intended target 
Payload The active agent or effect mechanism 
Levels of Effect Manipulate and destroy dimensions 
(Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, and Destroy) 
Parameters to Consider Timing, Time, Quality, Quantity, & Costs 
(T2Q2C) 
Effects Assessment Indicators Flags, triggers, or events identified to help 
assessment efforts in observing and 
analyzing the success or failure of the 
offensive action in regards to the desired 
effects 
The IW targeteer identifies delivery method and payload characteristics to 
the level of detail required to employ the action or weapon. Situation and theatre 
specific circumstances will drive the level of effect and parameters to consider. 
This is where the "human in the loop" is very important, incorporating the 
nuances of the current environment into the process. In addition, weapon and 
target packaging must be further coordinated to ensure the tasking is still 
appropriate and possible due to any resource or weapon redirection. 
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The second step in this phase is to identify effects assessment indicators 
(EAIs). EAIs are flags, triggers, or events of a mission, weapon, or method that 
can be "watched" for success or failure in obtaining the desired decision and 
effect. These indicators are based on analyzing the theatre situation, appropriate 
measures of effectiveness, weapon characteristics, and desired effects. 
The weaponeered targets and EAIs are forwarded to the IW Flight's 
combat operations and IIW personnel for incorporation into current operations 
and intelligence collection and used in the next phases of the process. 
4.7.3  The Force Execution Phase 
The Force Execution Phase is when the actual execution of the mission or 
employment of the weapon occurs. In addition, any redirection and deconfliction 
of target selection occurs in this phase.    An important aspect of this phase is the 
retargeting and time sensitive targeting opportunities. IO planners are required 
to have situational awareness and operational knowledge of the current 
battlespace.   This requires inputs from both phase I and II. In order to turn 
situational awareness into battlespace knowledge and ultimately an appropriate 
decision, the 10 planner will need more knowledge then weaponeered targets 
and the appropriate EAIs. He or she will have to know "why" these targets were 
selected and the desired decisions and effects. This type of comprehensive 
knowledge about what is wanted and what should happen would assist the 10 
planner in making critical and timely real-time targeting changes if indicators are 
prematurely observed. 
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The deliverables, affected targets and assessment information, although 
not controlled by the 10 planner within the AOC, are passed to the next phase of 
the process. These deliverables are gathered and analyzed in the next phase. 
4.7.4  The IW Combat-Assessment Analysis Phase 
Effects Based Target Development 
IW Weaponeering & Force Application 
Force Execution 
IW Combat-Assessment Analysis 
Effects of Weapon   |^ 
Weapon Specific 
Assessment Analysis 
Weapon • Mission • Method 
3E 
Effects on Mission 
Mission Specific 
Effects of Method 
Method Specific 
Figure 4-10. Phase IV—IW Combat-Assessment Analysis 
The IW Combat-Assessment Analysis is the essential feedback 
mechanism to identify success or failure of the different aspects of offensive and 
defensive effectiveness. In parallel with conventional combat assessment, IW 
offensive assessment is broken down into several different areas of concern. 
Figure 4-10 illustrates the components of this phase. 
Three types of analysis are proposed for the tactical level of operations of 
IW. 
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1. Weapon Specific 
This is the effectiveness of the weapon or action's effect to the 
intended information component and aimpoint. 
Did the action/weapon perform as expected? 
2. Method Specific 
This is the effectiveness of the tactics, platform, and payload of the 
weapon chosen. 
Did the method, platform, and payload chosen perform as expected? 
3. Mission Specific 
This is the effectiveness of the action's effect on the decision made. 
Did the action/weapon result in the desired effect? 
The output to this phase is the effectiveness analysis, which is fed back 
into the targeting and ATO cycles. This feedback aids in the adjustments 
required to ensure effects based operations and planning in meeting the stated 
strategy and objectives. Table 4- 4 summarizes the general steps an IO planner 
must accomplish within each phase of the process. 
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Table 4- 4. Summary of IW Planning Process Steps 
Phase 1—Effects Based Target Development A process of target aimpoint selection that focuses 
on the effect or result an action may produce 
Input:      Strategy and Objectives 
Outputs: Desired Effect & 
Aimpoints 
Phase 1 Steps 
Identify Desired Effect 
Identify Desired Decision of the Adversary 
Identify the 13 Component to be attacked 
Identify the attributes within each component to be 
attacked 
Phase II—IW Weaponeering & Force Application Determining and matching the appropriate types of 
IW weapon capabilities to the specific target and 
aimpoint 
Inputs:    Desired Effect & 
Aimpoints 
Outputs: Weaponeered Targets & EAIs 
Note: More comprehensive feasibility analysis 
should be conducted during the deliberate 
planning phase. 
Phase II Steps 
Identify weapon system that could be used for 
each selected aimpoint 
Identify the delivery method, platform, & payload 
Identify the Level of Effect possible 
Identify the T2Q2C characteristics 
Conduct a feasibility analysis for each weapon 
possibility 
Phase Ill-Force Execution The actual execution of the mission or employment 
of the weapon. Any redirection and deconfliction of 
target selection also occurs. 
Inputs:    Weaponeered Targets & EAIs 
Outputs: Affected Targets & Effects 
Note: Planners must also understand the 
strategy, objectives, desired effects, and desired 
decisions that represent each target or target 
package and the associated EAIs. 
Phase III Steps 
Observe current operations 
Identify any pre-mature EAIs 
Identify time-sensitive targeting requirements 
Phase IV—IW Combat-Assessment Analysis Post strike data assessment analysis based on 
effects assessment indicators. Three levels of 
assessment; decision, weapon, and method should 
be accomplished. 
Inputs:    Affected Targets & Collection 
Results 
Outputs: Effectiveness Analysis 
Note: Planners must also understand the 
strategy, objectives, desired effects, and desired 
decisions that represent each target or target 
package and the associated EAIs. 
Phase IV Steps 
Observe operations for EAIs 
Assess Decision effects 
Assess Weapon effectiveness 
Assess Method effectiveness 
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4.8   Conclusion 
The concepts, definitions, and process presented are developed to 
suggest one possible way of working within the current and given Air Force 
environment and implementing IW as a supported and primary weapon choice. It 
attempts to focus on the commonalties found across theatres and the information 
community. The concepts are based upon assumptions, interpretations, and 
conclusions drawn from the doctrine and policy guiding the operationalization of 
10. 
Its basis is a result of a recombination of old and new in order to 
operationalize IW capabilities. The first part of this chapter, postulates three new 
concepts in order to position and shape a realm where IW-related military 
operations can take place. The first concept is a new offensive mission of 
achieving Precision Engagement.   The second concept is the primary offensive 
IW goal of affecting the information factors of the adversary's decisions to 
achieve the desired effect. The third concept is a common view of the IW 
battlespace of 13 target sets and effect points. 
The second part of this chapter suggest a process that is a systematic 
way to focus on the necessary deliverables in all planning phases within the AOC 
and also aides in the further decomposition of the battlespace in regards to lower 
level targets and specific aimpoints. If these concepts are accepted in its 
entirety, it should aid the 10 planners as they strive to position IW capabilities as 
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a supported primary weapon choice, as well as, a supporting function to the 
kinetic and traditional forms of warfare. 
Chapter 5 presents an assessment of the suggested 10 Planning process 
by both operational level and senior level personnel within the 10 community. 
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5    Assessment Analysis 
5.1   The Assessments 
Two sets of activities were used to assess the possible usefulness and 
usability of the concepts derived and the process developed in this research. 
The first activity is termed the Presentation Assessment. The objective of this 
activity was to assess the usefulness and usability of the suggested process 
across a wide range of qualified participants. The second activity was called the 
Senior Level Assessment. The objective of this activity was focused on obtaining 
an initial assessment of the usefulness of the different concepts and process to 
the IO community. Due to the relatively small sample sizes, statistical analysis 
was not conducted. The data is provided in tabular form. 
5.1.1   The Presentation Assessment 
The presentation assessment activity was conducted at the Air Force 
Information Warfare Center and included 25 participants. Two briefings were 
given to include background material, definitions of concepts, and the suggested 
process, which is shown in Chapter 4.   Feedback questionnaires were handed 
out at the end of the presentations and participants were requested to voluntarily 
complete them. The participant's ranged in rank from Technical Sergeant to 
Colonel. Their level of experience ranged from a new recruit into IO, to extensive 
targeteering and command and control warfare involvement, to a group 
commander of the IO group at Kelly AFB. 
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Of the 25 participants, 17 feedback questionnaires were returned. Of the 
eight participants that did not respond, only three chose not to fill out the 
questionnaire. The other five left during the briefing due to prior engagements 
and were not asked to fill out a feedback questionnaire. This resulted in a 
response rate of 17 of 20 or 85%. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in 
Appendix C. 
Results—Presentation. The feedback questionnaire was divided into 
three separate parts. The objective of Part 1 was to assess if the suggested 
process appeared to be easy to use and/or useful.  The actual responses are 
summarized in Table 5-1. A graphical representation is presented in Figure 5-1. 









1 Easy to use 0 0 3 14 0 
% of Response 0% 0% 18% 82% 0% 
2 Useful 0 1 0 10 6 






Strongly   Disagree       No 
Disagree Opinion 
::>rt&äfc&löjfe 
Agree     Strongly 
Agree 
I Easy to Use 
I Useful 
Figure 5-1. Presentation Survey Part 1—Graphical View of Responses 
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Part 1 Analysis: The analysis is divide into two possible parts; the 
respondent's belief that the process was easy to use and usefulness. Fourteen 
of the 17 respondents believed the process were easy to use, leading to an 82% 
"belief rate. In regards to the process' usefulness, 16 of the 17 respondents 
believed that the process was useful by marking agreed or strongly agreed for a 
94% "belief rate.   Both of these areas seem to support a strong belief that the 
process is easy to use and useful. 
Part 2: The objective of Part 2 was twofold. First, part 2 served as a 
second check on the process assessment for usefulness. Second, it was used to 
identify any unusual issues in each of the aspects presented in the briefing. 
These aspects were broken down into three areas; process, definitions, and 
information environment.   As mentioned above, question 2a was included to 
check if there was a supporting relationship between part 1 and part 2 of the 
feedback questionnaire in regards to the usefulness of the process. The 
respondent's results are summarized below in Table 5- 2. 
Table 5- 2 Presentation Survey Part 2—Summary of Responses 
Presentation—Part 2 
Question Number of 
Responses 
% of 
Responses of 11 
%of 
Responses of 17 
a. Process 9 82% 53% 
b. Definitions 7 64% 41% 
c. Information Environment 9 82% 53% 
Part 2 Analysis. There seem to be a positive relationship between Part 1, 
and Part 2 of the feedback questionnaire in regards to the usefulness of the 
process. Eleven participants responded in Part 2 of the questionnaire. Nine of 
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the sixteen participants that agreed or strongly agreed in Part 1 (to identifying 
that they believed the process seem to be useful in identifying possible actions to 
be taken) also indicated that they would use the suggested process in the future. 
Three participants gave no responses in Part 2, two did not circle "process" and 
did circle another aspect, and two made notes in Part 2, but did not circle the 
area as instructed. The positive relationship between Part 1 and Part 2, serves 
as a good indicator that respondents (9 of the original 17) consistently believed 
the process would be useful in the future. 
The second objective of Part 2 was also positive. The participants that 
responded seem to feel that the other aspects, definitions and the information 
environment, would be of use to them in the future. 
Part 3: The objective of Part 3 was to check if any contradictions could be 
observed in the first two parts of the survey. 
Part 3 Analysis: Only one participant chose to circle one aspect, but also 
noted that it "is important, but lesser of the other two (selections given). 
Therefore, there seem to be no contradictions. 
Summary of Results—Presentation. The respondents provided positive 
and strong support to this initial assessment of the process' being easy to use 
and its usefulness. The definitions and information environment presented were 
also believed to be of use to the respondents.   Although, three participants 
chose not to complete the feedback questionnaire, there was no negative 
feedback from the participants that did respond. 
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5.1.2  Senior Level Assessment 
The senior level assessment activity consisted of a request to review and 
comment on a report outlining the background, the concepts, and the developed 
process.   The report was sent over e-mail and responses were through the use 
of the furnished feedback questionnaires or a personal interview.   Feedback 
questionnaires were distributed, but its use was not mandatory.   Responses 
were accepted in any format. Table 5- 3 summarizes the list of reviewers 
requested to participate in the review. The reviewers were selected for their 
experience and their direct exposure to on-going IO research efforts and the 
development and growth of the IO community. 





Responsibility or Career 











39 IPS (School house) 
J-3 Technical Director 
IO Project Mgr 
Retired Vice IO Group CC 








39 IPS (School house) 
39 IPS (School house) 
23 IPS 
PACAF IW Flight 
12AF/IW Flight 
7AF/IW Flight 
Director of Pperations 
Targeeter 
IO Intel Analyst 
Commander/Intelligence Officer 
IO Planner/Superintendent 










IO Planner unable-Leave 
*The feedback questionnaire received from the PACAF IW representative was an effort of three 
IW Flight members. Each member reviewed the report and one feedback form was returned 
representing a consolidation of their inputs. 
Results—Senior Level Review. The objective of this assessment activity 
was to obtain an initial overall assessment of the usefulness of the concepts and 
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suggested process across a variety of 10 experts within the community.   The 
feedback questionnaire used for this activity was divided into four parts. 
Part 1: The objective of Part 1 of the questionnaire was to obtain an 
opinion regarding the approval or disapproval of the suggested process and 
other important concepts presented in the research report, The concepts were 
broken down into five areas; the process, I0 as a primary weapon system, the 
goal of affecting the information factors, the IW battlespace, and the concept of 
effects assessment indicators.   This activity received a 60% (9 of 15) response 
rate. 
Table 5- 4 presents a summary of the responses for Part 1. Figure 5- 2 is 
a graphical representation of the responses. The nine respondents, while a 
small sample, do represent a highly qualified group of senior IO personnel in the 
US Air Force. 











1. Process 0 0 0 3 6 
% of Responses 0% 0% 0% 33% 67% 
2. Primary Weapon 0 0 0 4 5 
% of Responses 0% 0% 0% 44% 55% 
3. Goal-Info Factors 0 0 0 4 5 
% of Responses 0% 0% 0% 44% 55% 
4. IW Battlespace 0 0 0 7 2 
% of Responses 0% 0% 0% 78% 22% 
5. EAIs 0 0 1 6 2 
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Strongly        No Opinion        Strongly 
Disapprove Approve 
Figure 5- 2. Senior Level Survey Part 1—Graphical View of Responses 
Part 1 Analysis: All respondents either approved or strongly approved in 
all but one of the aspects presented.   One respondent expressed "no opinion" in 
one aspect; Effects Assessment Indicator. 
Part 2: The objective of Part 2 was to obtain an initial assessment in 
regards to the usefulness to the IO community of the different aspects presented 
in the research. In addition, this part of the questionnaire would also identify any 
issues or suggestions for improvements. Seven of the nine participants 
responded. A summary of responses is included in Table 5- 5. 
Table 5- 5. Senior Level Survey Part 2—Summary of Responses 
Senior Level—Part 2 
Question Number of 
Responses 
%of 
Responses of 7 
%of 
Responses of 9 
a. Process 5 71% 55% 
b. IW as Primary Weapon 4 57% 44% 
c. Goal: Info Factors 5 71% 55% 
d. IW Battlespace 6 86% 67% 
e. Effects Indicators 6 86% 67% 
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Part 2 Analysis: Seven of the nine respondents used part 2 to explicitly 
identify those aspects they thought would be useful to the 10 community. Three 
respondents made extensive remarks in this part. The majority of the remarks 
were comments regarding real world circumstances and hardships being faced 
by 10 planners in the field. 
Part 3: The objective of part 3 of this questionnaire was to see if any 
contradictions to prior responses could be found. In addition, this part of the 
questionnaire would also identify any issues the participants may have with the 
different aspects of the research. 
Part 3 Analysis: Only one participant chose to circle one aspect, but also 
noted that it "it was least useful, but not non-useful". Therefore, there seem to be 
no contradictions to previous responses in other parts of the questionnaire. 
Part 4: This part was a catch all category of "General Comments". It 
allowed the respondents to respond freely to anything and everything presented 
in the research report. 
Part 4 Analysis: Overall use of this part of the questionnaire was very 
good. All but one respondent wrote a narrative to compliment their inputs. Most 
comments focused on the 10 environment in general and suggestions to the 
clarify points made in the report. There was one common theme that was easily 
identified from four of seven narratives. The respondents believed that the report 
was a great start of focused research needed in the 10 community.   Several 
quotes are included below to support this conclusion. 
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"This effort is superb in that it unfolds the path to the above goal." 
Vice Commander, 67 IOG, Retired 
"...no-nonsense approach to offensive IW offers a blueprint for 
future efforts to systematically exploit the information realm to our 
advantage." 
AFRL 10 Experiment Developer 
"This type of focused research is precisely what's needed for the 10 
community (and Air Force) to succeed." 
PACAF IWF 
"AFRL is seriously looking at leveraging and or extending this 
approach to IW planning for the IWFs." 
AFRL Project Manager 
"This methodology marries well with the AFTTP 3-1, Vol 36 
[Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for IO], due out late this 
spring." 
IO Intel Analyst 
Summary of Results—Senior Level. The responses received from this 
assessment activity indicated a high approval rate of the different aspects 
reviewed by the participants. In addition, an overall positive and supporting 
assessment of the usefulness to the IO community of the different aspects was 
also found. 
5.2   Summary 
The analysis of the two assessment activities seems to support an initial 
overall positive response to the concepts, definitions, and processes suggested 
within this research. The Presentation assessment seems to indicate that the 
suggested process appears to be easy to use and useful. The other aspects, 
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definitions and the information environment seemed to be well accepted as 
useful. 
The Senior Level assessment also indicated high approval in all aspects 
of the assessment. In addition, this group seems to agree that the concepts and 
process developed in this research would be useful to the 10 community and is 
just a beginning for further research needed in this area. 
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6    Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1   Research Conclusions 
The Air Force has publicly acknowledged the importance of the 
information environment by declaring that it should be considered a realm with its 
own characteristics just as land, sea, air, and space (Cornerstones, 1995: 8). In 
addition, it also suggests that information has evolved from being a supporting 
function to being a weapon itself (AFDD 2-5,1998:1-2). This acknowledgement 
is the first step in identifying the need to take action. This research is the next 
step to identifying the necessary concepts and definitions in attempting to give 
shape to the information environment as a realm and a potential weapon option. 
This research has focused on answering the question, 
"How can offensive IW be integrated within the AF as a primary 
weapon choice?" 
An exploratory research of constant comparison, progressive analysis, 
clarification, and evolving conclusions was conducted through field observations, 
informal interviews, and literature reviews.   The research boundaries were set to 
investigate the AF's offensive component of IW and the affects of single offensive 
actions. 
Although the research identified several important facts about IO, several 
components necessary to forming a framework were not found and required 
development and definition. A summary of the items required to transform 
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offensive IW into a supported and primary weapon option are outlined in Table 6- 
1. 
Table 6-1. Research Results 
Facts about IO Developed Components 
AF IO mission—Establish and Maintain 
Information Superiority 
Redefining the Offensive IW mission— 
Precision Engagement 
AF's Organizational Structure—NAF 
and Aerospace Operations Center 
Goal of offensive IW—Affecting 
Information Factors 
IO Planner's Deliverables—Target 
Nominations, Weapneered Targets, 
Assessment Indicators 
The IW Battlespace—Target Sets, 
Effect Points, Costs, and Measures of 
Effectiveness 
Personnel/Manpower—IW Flights Understanding the Decision 
Environment—Information Factors 
IO Planning Process—Effects based, 
Weapon Characteristics, and Effects 
Assessment Indicators 
This research has attempted to take doctrine and the current Air Force 
environment and identify a way to transform offensive IW from a supporting 
function of Information Superiority to a primary weapon option with a focus on 
Precision Engagement. It proposes a change in this focus only to compliment 
the supporting and necessary functions associated with obtaining information 
superiority. 
This research has resulted in various concepts, definitions, and a 
suggested process in order to help form a framework to be used at the 
operational and tactical level of operations and within the current AF 
organizational structure. 
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6.2   Limitations of the Research 
Warfighting requires the synergistic integration of all capabilities (land, 
sea, air, and space, as well as information) available to be able to appropriately 
task and expend the correct resources for the right end or desired result. This 
research is focused upon outlining the Air Force environment with respect to the 
offensive, single action IW capabilities. Although this can be seen as an overall 
limitation, knowing the affect of a single action was required as the environment 
was deciphered and decomposed to identify the possible points that can affect a 
system. Synergistic combinations can only be built upon the combining of known 
single actions.   In addition, the focus upon the offensive component of 
Information Warfare, was chosen because knowing what and how a system or 
environment can be affect or attacked will automatically identify the necessary 
defensive actions to protect it. Defending systems without knowing what and 
how it can be attacked can result in a wasteful, unfocused, and reactive defense 
plan. 
6.3   Recommendations for Future Research 
Information Warfare, which is comprised of both defensive and offensive 
actions, requires extensive and continued research in order for it to continue to 
evolve into a primary weapon option within the Air Force. The suggestions 
identified here pertain to this specific research effort. 
The process suggested in this research requires further decomposition to 
be able to be used within the day-to-day operations of the AF IW operations. 
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Appendix A provides a concept and procedure in attempting to decipher and 
decompose the IW battlespace. Through several pilot studies conducted during 
the course of this research, it became apparent that a repository of generic 
targets and possible offensive actions could be identified using this procedure. A 
research opportunity exists for the comprehensive decomposition of the IW 
battlespace. 
Another research opportunity would be to conduct a field validation of the 
suggested process. Although the process has been defined and received an 
initial positive assessment, a field experiment would help to identify the strengths, 
weaknesses, and limitations of the definitions, concepts, and process. 
One of the major deliverables of the 10 planner is the development of 
target nominations and assessment indicators. Another research opportunity lies 
in attempting to validate the concepts and definitions proposed within the IW 
Weaponeering and Force Application phase of the suggested process.   The 
concepts and definitions can be tested by actually trying to develop target 
aimpoints, weapon characteristics, and appropriate assessment indicators. 
6.4   Recommendations 
The 10 community has come a long way since the release of 
Cornerstones in 1995 and the acknowledgement that the information realm had 
its own characteristics as do land, sea, air, and space.   It has gone through a 
great deal of refining since then, but as this research has shown (reference Table 
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6-1), it still has a long way to go as it attempts to integrate IO into the current AF 
environment. 
There are many hurdles facing the IO community, but three are identified 
here with possible recommendations for action. The first is the reluctance of the 
community to separately analyze and identify the requirements of the two pillars 
of IW; attack and defend. This thesis postulates that awareness and knowledge 
of possible offensive actions upon its battlespace must be identified and 
analyzed before a proactive approach to integrating IO can take place. Although 
offensive actions must be closely integrated with the defensive component, 
offensive capabilities of oneself and ones opponents should drive and determine 
its defense. Using a football analogy, a team cannot win or score without 
engaging its strengths and capabilities upon the opponent's weaknesses in its 
offensive plays towards the goal. Although a good defense may keep the 
opponents from scoring, it does very little towards moving the team towards its 
ultimate goal of winning.   As suggested above, awareness and knowledge about 
offensive capabilities (both our own and the adversary) must be identified in 
order to better defend and ultimately act and win. Until the offensive side of IW is 
proactively identified, analyzed, and cataloged, IW will always remain in a 
reactive and supporting role. 
The second hurdle can easily be surpassed by focusing offensive IW on 
accomplishing precision engagement. This goal goes hand in hand with the 
above recommendation of proactively analyzing the offensive component of IW 
and how precise engagement must be accomplished. This recommendation 
6-5 
does not lessen the importance of the current 10 mission of achieving Information 
Superiority, but emphasizes its importance and the necessity of supporting the 
other and essential core competencies, including precision engagement in the 
ultimate goal of accomplishing strategy and objectives. The capabilities of 
offensive IW must use the benefits of information superiority towards identifying 
the required factors in the attainment of engaging its actions and weapons in a 
precise manner. 
The third hurdle is the lack of an IW specific battlespace with its own 
characteristics to conduct military operations. IW must proactively start to 
identify its own target sets along with effects points, costs of deployment, and 
measures of effectiveness. 
The 10 community faces many hurdles in its integration efforts within the 
AF, however incorporation of the above recommendations could definitely aid in 
succinctly positioning itself as a separate realm with its own characteristics. The 
IW Battlespace, associated concepts, and proposed process introduced in this 
research would be a great starting point in setting the framework for the 
integration of 10 within the AF as a primary weapon option. 
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A   Appendix—Research Extension 
A.1   Introduction 
The purpose of this appendix is to introduce the next step in 
vectoring offensive IW as a primary weapon option within the current AF 
environment. This appendix is an informal extension of the proposed process 
with the main objective of decomposing the IW Battlespace in support of 
accomplishing the IO Planner's target nomination deliverable and acquiring a 
better knowledge of offensive IW actions. 
To conduct offensive IW actions at the operational and tactical level of 
operations, there are three important knowledge requirements; battlefield 
characteristics, adversary's characteristics, and our own weapon characteristics 
and capabilities (AFI13-1AOC, 1999: 8). The process proposed presents several 
different ideas and concepts, which begin to address some of the knowledge 
requirements of the battlefield. These concepts are listing below. 
a. A realignment of the offensive IW objective (Affect Information Factors 
to Induce the Desired Decision to achieve the Desired Effects) 
b. An IW Battlespace of common Target Sets and Effect Point 
c. A common planning process aligned with the targeting cycle and 
focused on end products/deliverables 
The knowledge of the adversary's characteristics can be identified by the 
intelligence function termed the intelligence preparation of the battlespace. In the 
past, much of this support function has been focused upon the collection 
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requirements for the deployment of conventional methods of defensive and 
offensive actions. The information requirements to deploy 10 weapons have 
been identified as a challenge to the intelligence community, requiring 
unprecedented levels of detail through compressed collection timelines to 
collecting and analyzing new types of intelligence never before required (AFP 14- 
210,1998: 83). In addition, it will take a collaborative effort of operations, 
intelligence, and technical communities to identify what recurring information is 
truly needed to conduct IO actions (AFP 14-210,1998: 83). Collecting 
EVERYTHING is expensive, time consuming, and wasteful. Focusing collection 
efforts, however, requires specific goals, methods, and objectives. 
The next piece of the IW puzzle is knowledge of our own weapons 
capabilities. The IW Weaponeering and Force Application phase of the proposed 
process can be separated into weapon characteristics, level of effort, measures 
of effectiveness, and effects assessment indicators. Although the details of the 
action's deployment will be driven by the specific situation and theatre 
characteristics and can only be determined at the time of action deployment, 
there is a level of commonality that can and must be identified to aid planners, 
targeteers, intelligence collectors, and assessment analyst.   This proposed next 
step is an attempt to capture this level of commonality.   Table A-1 below 
summaries the three main knowledge requirements identified earlier in this 
appendix. 
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Table A-1 .Summary of Knowledge Requirements 
IW Battlespace Characteristics 
Information 
Increase info needed for awareness 
Increase age of info 
Increase error content 




Increase error induced by system 
Decrease completeness induced by system 
Increase recovery rate 
Defeat physical hardness 
Defeat security measures and processes 
Defeat detection system 
Information Based Processes 
Increase consumption of essential resources 
Increase consumption of essential time 
Reduce timeliness of process 
Reduce accuracy of process 
Reduce focus of process 




Normal Intel Relationships 
IO specific relationships 
Information Decision Characteristics 
IW Weapon Characteristics 
Capabilities 
What can it affect and how? 




Limitations and Weaknesses 
What can it affect and how? 
Countermeasures? 
Info needed to deploy 




A.2   The Proposed Next Step 
In order to do a better job of identifying and acquiring the knowledge 
needed to use offensive IW actions effectively, all three knowledge areas must 
be improved. The proposed process presented attempts to improve and create a 
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common view of the IW battlespace, which can serve as a starting point across 
the community. This will also help in the collection efforts of our adversary's 
characteristics. 
The next few paragraphs is the proposed next step to improving our 
knowledge of offensive IW weapon/action capabilities. The approach will also 
aid in identifying recurring and specific intelligence collection requirements. 
The goal of the next step is to take the initial results and to create a "living' 
repository of offensive actions and weapon capabilities (at a categorical level). 
This could then be used at the operational level of operations as a starting point 
to further decompose the information realm (IW Battlespace) and to arrive at 
specific and area of interest target aimpoint nominations. The process/procedure 
uses brainstorming to identify possible actions to attack or affect the information 
realm and incorporates the concepts within the IW Weaponeering and Force 
Application Phase of the proposed 10 planning process.    Figure A-1 represents 
Phase II—IW Weaponeering and Force Application. 
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Effects Based Target Development 
IW Weaponeering & Force Application 
Weapon Characteristics 
" Weapon System 
•Delivery Tactic and Platform 
•Payload 
Level of Effect 
■ Manipulate & Destroy 
<: 
Parameters to Consider 
 •T2Q2C  
Measures of Effectiveness 
• Attack upon Aimpoint 
Ik Effects Assessment Indicators • Triggers/Flags/Activities to watch to assess success or failure  A 
_Weaponeered Targets & EA Indicators^ 
Force Execution 
IW Combat-Assessment Analysis 
Effectiveness Analysis 
Figure A- I.Phase I—IW Weaponeering & Force Application 
The brainstorming session is made up of a variety of subject matter 
experts. The suggested procedure uses the information realm and associated 
effect points as its IW battlespace baseline. Measures of effectiveness and 
weapon characteristics are the essential building blocks in identifying delivery 
methods, platform, payload, and effects assessment indicators. 
The session can be broken down into two distinct steps. It is important to 
note that these sessions are focused upon the IW Battlespace's target sets and 
effect points as presented within this research. Therefore, the inputs into Phase 
II—IW Weaponeering and Force Application are the target and desired effects. 
Although, this phase can be used for both traditional kinetic weapon systems, it is 
used in the session to identifying IW weapon actions. The two steps are 
summarized in Table A- 2 below. 
A-5 
Table A- 2. Summary of Steps of Brainstorming Session 
Phase 1—Weapon/Action Characteristics Identification 
Identify methods How can we affect (devalue) this effect point of the IW Battlespace? 
Identify level of effort Which D (deny, disrupt, degrade, destroy) applies with the specific 
method? 
Identify the possible payloads for 
each method 
What will be required to damage or affect the target? 
Identify the possible platforms to 
be used for each method 
What will be required to get the payload to the desired target? 
Note: Time, timing, quality, quantity, and costs are applied and determined at the time of deployment of 
the action. 
Phase 2—Effects Assessment Indicator Identification 
Identify triggers, flags, or events 
that are focused on method, 
platform, or payload success or 
failure 
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if the 
weapon characteristics (method, platform, or payload) SUCCEEDED 
as planned? 
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if the 
weapon characteristics (method, platform, or payload) FAILED as 
planned? 
Identify triggers, flags, or events 
that are focused on the 
characteristics of the measures 
of effectiveness 
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if we 
SUCCEEDED at affecting the correct attribute or effect point? 
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if we 
FAILED at affecting the correct attribute or effect point? 
Once the weapon characteristics are identified, as outlined in the above 
table, appropriate effects assessment indicators (EAIs) are identified for each 
weapon action. Once weapon capabilities and actions are identified several 
other areas become possible. Some of the benefits are listed in Table A- 3. 
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Table A- 3. Benefits of Identifying Weapon Characteristics 
Improved Understanding of Action/Weapon Modification and Development 




Improved Understanding and Identification of Information, Intel Collection, 
and Action Deployment Requirements 
1 Recurring (common across the battlespace) 
1 Specific (to the AOI or circumstance) 
Improved Understanding and Identification of Information Assurance 
Posture Requirements 
Offensive Action Possibilities 
Countermeasure Action Requirements 
Defensive Action Requirements(Policies and 
Procedures) 
Infrastructure Requirements (Software, Hardware, 
Configuration) 
Manpower Requirements (Attacker and Defender) 
In addition to the above benefits, a repository of weapon 
capabilities/actions and their possible EAIs can be identified and passed on to all 
10 planners to be used and improved upon during both deliberate and crisis 
action planning phases. The identification of the possible weapon 
capabilities/actions can possibly ensure a baseline of knowledge and help 
creative thinking to begin at a broader and higher level. 
A.3   Informal Studies 
In order to test and refine the procedures of this next step, several studies 
were performed during the course of this research. The purpose of these studies 
was twofold. The first purpose was an attempt to verify that the concepts used in 
the developed process could be applied across the 10 environment. These 
concepts are weapon methods, delivery platform, payload, and effects 
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assessment indicators (EAIs). The second was to identify a procedure or 
exercise that would begin to further decompose the offensive objective hierarchy 
(target sets and effect points) in systematic and simple way that could possibly 
be used in the day-to-day operations of an 10 Planner. In addition, the 
information identified would then be used to populate a repository of common 
actions for each effect point within the battlespace.   The hypothesis was, "that 
the IW battlespace was comprised of a level of commonality where 
decomposition could take place and a better understanding of the types of 
offensive actions could be realized". 
A.4  An Initial and Subjective Analysis 
Several groups were asked to participate in the informal studies. Two of 
the sessions analyzed the same IW Battlespace attribute, bandwidth. In support 
of the hypothesis, both groups tended to identify similar types of actions. The 
results of both groups are listed in Table A- 4 below. 
Table A-4. Results of Sessions 
Effect Point: Reduce Bandwidth 
Group 1—AFIT IW Students Group 2—AFIWC Members 
Reconfigure Equipment Reconfigure HW 
Destroy Links Affect Comm Nodes 
Distributed DOS Distributed DOS 
Send Virus Virus 
Increase Traffic Electronic Jamming 
Note: Items are not prioritized or in any specific order 
A.5   Conclusion 
The main objective of this appendix is to introduce a procedure that will 
aid in decomposing the IW Battlespace and acquiring a better knowledge of 
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offensive IW actions. It incorporates some of the concepts identified during the 
course of the research; effect points, weapon characteristics, and effects 
assessment indicators. 
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B    Appendix—IW Battlespace 
The purpose of this appendix is to consolidate all products pertaining to 
the Offensive IW Battlespace. The IW Battlespace and Costs diagrams are 
included in "full" size in this appendix for easier reference and viewing. In 
addition, two other products are included to accompany these diagrams and act 
as quick reference (crib) sheets. The first is a narrative, which attempts to list the 
different aspects of the IW Battlespace in a consolidated format. The second 
item is the Measures of Effectiveness Table. This is also meant to be a quick 
reference item to be used as needed or more specifically within the exercise or 
brainstorming sessions. 
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Offensive IW Battlespace—Target Sets and Efffect Points 
Goals, Definitions, Actions, Effects, and Measures 
This product is meant to compliment both the IW Battlespace—Target Sets and Effect 
Point and Cost diagrams. It is a quick reference guide that attempts to list the different aspects of 
the IW Battlespace in a consolidated format. 
The offensive objectives presented here were first introduced as the Value Hierarchy for 
the Information Realm and the Objectives Hierarchy for Offensive Information Operations and 
created by Capt Michael P. Doyle as part of his thesis research in 1998.   Incorporation of these 
hierarchies into this research proved beneficial, but also required several modifications. This 
appendix represents the modified version. One major modification was the incorporation of the 
overall goals of Information Operations as described below. 
The reference is set up in the following format. 
1. Overall goals of Information Operations Underlined and Bolded 
1a. Strategic goals 
1b. Operational and Tactical Goals 
1c. Definition 
1d. Offensive IO Objective (OIO) Actions Bolded 
2. Information component (Target Set) Underlined and Bolded 
2a. Definition 
3. Information subcomponent Underlined 
3a. Definition 
4. Information component attributes (Effect Points)        Numbered and Bolded 
4a. Definition 
4b. Affected by: 
4c: Offensive IO Objective (OIO) 
4d. Possible Level of Effect of OIO Action 
4e. Desired Effect 
4f. Measurement 
Overall Goals of Information Operations 
The goal of strategic level Information Operations is to influence the hearts and minds of 
our adversaries by affecting the decision maker and his or her decision making process. 
The goal of operational and tactical level of Information Operations is to affect 
information factors to induce a desired decision to achieve a desired effect. This is done 
by manipulation and destruction of the information realm in order to induce a decision of 
the adversary that benefits friendly forces. 
OIO Actions: Control the Potential Effect -3 alternatives 
Cause to Reject Truth—when the adversary is presented with the truth—rejects 
the truth—likely to accept the false 
Effect: Causes the adversary to doubt true information 
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Cause to Accept False—when the adversary is presented with the false— 
accepts the false—likely to reject the truth 
Effect: Causes the adversary to accept the false reality 
Cause to Accept Truth/Reject False—Sees reality clearly—lifts fog in a 
believable way 
Effect: Leads the adversary to the correct decision 
Measurement: Level of expected effect on decision 
Probability/Category: High, medium, low probability or no change 
Information—Data and its semantic meaning that conveys the intended message. 
It has no mass, physical form, and causes no action 
(1) Information Needed for Awareness—the minimum amount of 
information to update an existing body of knowledge in a manner that either 
changes the current picture or reduces uncertainty of the current picture. The 
value of info is linked to the amount of info required to update the decision 
maker's current understanding or picture of the decision environment. 
Affected by:    Amount and quality of info already held (body of knowledge) 
Amount and quality of the new info received 
OIO Objective: Increase Information Needed for Awareness 
OIO Action:     Manipulate & destroy information needed 
Desired Effect: Force adversary to need an increasing amount of 
information in order to maintain the same level of awareness. 
Measurement: Level of support required to maintain awareness level. 
Category: Maintenance Level (Hardware), System Operator Level (System 
Software), User/self fix Level (User Apps), no change or effect to updates 
(2) Age of Information—Timeliness (age) provides value to the decision 
making process. The subject of the information will drive the amount of time 
required between updates in order to maintain its value. Info is devalued as time 
passes. 
Affected by: The number of time cycles increase, information value is reduced 
by the increasing uncertainty of the battlespace. 
OIO Objective: Devalue/Increase Age of Information (As time passes, the value 
of the information is reduced with respect to decision making—increasing 
decision maker's uncertainty about the battlespace) 
OIO Action: Manipulate and destroy updates to information 
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Desired Effect: Reduce the timeliness of new or existing information to the 
adversary. 
Measurement: Number of change cycles since update. 
Quantity: 0-5 cycle times (Information more than 5 change cycles old is no 
longer valuable.) 
Fidelity—ability to convey, stores, and manipulate complete information without 
adding or allowing error to be added (information integrity). The components of 
the fidelity are error content and message completeness. 
(3) Error Content—The amount of aggregate errors in the relayed 
message 
Affected by: Information manipulation or destruction 
OIO Objective: Increase Error Content of Message 
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy content of message 
Desired Effects: Prevent the correct message/information from being 
received. 
Measurement: Percentage of error content in message 
Percentage: 0 to 100% 
(4) Completeness of Message—Ability to convey a complete message 
Affected by: Information manipulation and destruction 
OIO Objective: Decrease Completeness of Message 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy completeness of message 
Desired Effect: Prevent a complete message from being received 
Measurement: Relative amount of meaning retained 
Category: No meaning, major degrade, minor degrade, no change 
Information Systems—Any physical component that conveys, stores, or 
processes information without adding value to the decision making process. It 
provides physical form and sets it to motion 
(5) Bandwidth—The amount of information that can traverse simultaneously. 
Affected by: Amount of necessary bandwidth available 
OIO Objective: Reduce Bandwidth 
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010 Action: Manipulate & destroy available/relative bandwidth 
Desired Effect: Affect the relative amount of bandwidth necessary for continued 
operations. 
Measurement: Relative level of bandwidth available 
Category: Stopping/preventing, greatly reducing, moderately reducing, no 
change. 
(6) Throughput—The amount of signal that a system can send in a given 
amount of time. 
Affected by: Amount of signal that a system can send in a given amount of time. 
010 Objective: Reduce Throughput 
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy available throughput 
Desired Effect: Affect the amount of throughput available 
Measurement: Relative level of throughput available 
Category: Stopping, greatly reducing, moderately reducing, no change. 
Fidelity—ability to convey, stores, and manipulate complete information without 
system error being added. The components of the fidelity are error content and 
message completeness. 
(7) Error Content—The amount of aggregate errors in the relayed 
message 
Affected by: System induced (transmission or reception) error 
010 Objective:   Increase Error Content 
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy system induced message error 
Desired Effect: Disable the receiver to discriminate the message 
properly. 
Measurement: Percentage of error content on system 
Percentage: 0 to 100% 
(8) Completeness of Message—Ability to convey a complete message 
independent of system errors 
Affected by: Induced and system noise 
OIO Objective: Decrease Completeness of Message 
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010 Action: Manipulate & destroy completeness of message 
Desired Effect: Prevent a complete message from being received. 
Measurement: Relative amount of meaning retained 
Category: No meaning, major degrade, minor degrade, no change 
Defeat Security—The level of security the system provides to the decision maker 
both in secure capability and intrusion detection. It is based on how hard it is to 
physically penetrate the system, how quickly it can recover from a degraded 
state, how difficulty encountered when attempting to physically penetrate it. 
(9) Recovery Rate (How long to recover)—The amount of time that is 
required for a system to recover from a degraded condition (virtual 
hardness) 
Affected by: The ability for the system to return to full operating capacity. 
010 Objective: Increase recovery time 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy recovery time of system 
Desired Effect: To increase the amount of time it takes for system to be 
recovered. 
Measurement: Number of change cycles over which system is unable to 
perform mission. The number of adversary's missed decision cycle. 
Quantity: 0-5 cycles (Any out of service time greater than 5 change 
cycles offer no more value to the attacker) 
Defeat Overall Security Capability—The non-physical protection (security 
measures and processes) of a system. 
(10) Effort to penetrate physical hardness—The level of 
difficulty associated with overcoming the physical protection of the 
system. This could include physical, active, and passive 
defenses. 
Affected by: Difficulty to penetrate hardness of system 
OIO Objective: Penetrate physical security of system 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy physical hardness of system 
Desired Effect: To physically degrade, disrupt, or destroy a 
system. 
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Measurement: Level of defeat affected 
Category: Completely defeat, moderately defeat, slightly defeat, 
no change (no capability) 
(11) Security Measures and Processes (Classification)—The 
ability to communicate without revealing the message content to 
unauthorized elements. 
Affected by: Compromises to the non-physical security measures 
and processes 
OIO Objective: Defeat security measures and processes 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy security measures and 
processes of system 
Desired Effect: To overcome security measures and processes 
(encryption, firewalls, classification levels, etc) 
Measurement: Likelihood of gaining access to system 
Probability/category: High probability, moderate probability, low 
probability, and no change 
(12) Intrusion Detection—The ability to detect, locate, and report 
intrusion to the system. 
Affected by: Ability to by-pass intrusion detection systems 
OIO Objective: Defeat detection system 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy detection system 
Desired Effect: Penetrate the system with the desired detection 
effect. 
Measurement: Expected ability to defeat the adversary's intrusion 
detection methods with desired effect. 
Category: Low, medium, high, and certain effect. 
Information-Based Processes—Any element that adds value to information and 
decision making process- 
Efficiency—The proper utilization of resources; personnel, equipment, software, 
other related materiel, and the amount of processing time of specific information 
(13) Essential Resources Consumed—The consumption of essential 
and required resources of a process. 
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Affected by: Resources allotted to a process or diverted from others 
OIO Objective: Increase Consumption of Essential Resources 
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy availability of essential resources 
Desired Effect: Increase the level of resources consumed by having 
items destroyed, replaced, disrupted, or supplemented. Consider finite 
resources that can be diverted from other processes 
Measurement: Consumption of Essential Resources 
Percentage: 0 to 100% 
(14) Essential Time Consumed— The consumption of essential and 
required time of a process. 
Affected by: Relative value of time consumed at the expense of other 
processes 
OIO Objective: Increase Consumption of Essential Time 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy availability of essential time required 
Desired Effect: Increase the amount of time an adversary must allocate 
to a process to maintain a given level of support—relative time consumed 
Measurement: Consumption of essential time 
Percentage: 0 to 100% 
Effectiveness—Information must support decision making in real time or must 
reduce long-term uncertainty about the battlespace 
(15) Timeliness—The availability of value-added products and 
information when needed. 
Affected by: Ability to provide products in a timely manner 
OIO Objective: Reduce timeliness of process 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy availability of essential time 
Desired Effect: Affect the receipt of the information, degrading or 
rendering information useless for the decision at hand. 
Measurement: Number of change cycles that the processed product is 
late 
Quantity: 0 to 3 decision cycles (Product or info loses all value after 3 
cycles) 
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(16) Accuracy—Information must be integrated and fused properly into 
an accurate product that is reliable and enhances decision-making. 
Affected by: Degrading accuracy of tools and products used in decision- 
making 
OIO Objective: Reduce accuracy of process 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy accuracy of process 
Desired Effect: Decrease accuracy of products from normal operating 
standards, degrading correct and consistent analysis 
Measurement: Degradation to process accuracy 
Percentage: Degradation (0 to 100%) 
(17) Focus—The ability to direct a course of action in a desired direction 
or accomplishment of a specific task. 
Affected by: Ability to actively direct a desired course or direction 
OIO Objective: Reduce Focus on Process 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy focus of process 
Desired Effect: Direct the process away from its intended use or towards 
the desired direction 
Measurement: Expected ability to redirect process 
Category: Completely redirect, moderately degraded, slightly degraded, 
no change 
(18) Resilience—The ability of the process to adapt to unexpected 
occurrences and still provide value to the decision maker and decision 
making process 
Affected by: Susceptibility to failure or degradation 
OIO Objective: Reduce Resilience of process 
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy adaptability of process 
Desired Effect: Force adversary to change tools/processes/leadership 
affecting the ability to adapt and recover. 
Measurement: Expected ability to reduce adaptability or recovery of 
process 
Category: Catastrophic failure, moderately degraded, slightly degraded, 
no change 
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Cost Objectives (values 0 to 100%) 
(C-1) Friendly personnel at risk—The cost of losing or injuring friendly 
personnel 
Affected by: Exposure to injury or death 
OIO Objective: Minimize Friendly Personnel at Risk 
Desired Effect: Minimize the relative risk of friendly personnel being injured or 
killed 
Measurement: Relative Level of Risk 
Percentage: 0 - 100% zero risk to high risk 
Slight risk: Losses not expected 
Moderate risk: Losses are expected 
High risk: Losses are certain 
(C-2) Sensitive Info at risk—The cost of exposure of sensitive info or 
technology—information/methods. Once exposed it will be available for others to 
use. 
Affected by: Exposure to adversary's intelligence gathering 
OIO Objective: Maintain sensitive information security 
Desired Effect: Keep sensitive information or technology from exposure, which 
could lead to usage by adversary 
Measurement: Expected level of proliferation 
Percentage: 0-100% (Probability of proliferation) 
(C-3) Weapon system survivability—The ability for the system to survive the 
mission. There are one-way systems, which survive if they reach the target, and 
reusable systems if they can be recovered from the mission. 
Affected by: System characteristics and ability to recover 
OIO Objective: Maximize system survivability 
Desired Effect: Plan for required actions to recover appropriate/applicable 
systems 
Measurement: Expected probability of survival 
Probability: 0 to 100% (linear increments) 
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(C-4) Collateral Damage—The secondary damage while striking a target. It 
includes, but not limited to the untended loss of allied personnel, noncombatants, 
destruction of cultural or sanctuaries and other places of cultural significance. 
Affected by: Untended effects or damage 
OIO Objective: Minimize Collateral Damage 
Desired Effect: Minimize the effects of collateral damage from chosen offensive 
action. 
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C    Appendix—Research Instruments 
This appendix is included as a repository of all of the research instruments 
used to request, present, or collect data. This appendix is made up of three 
different "packages" of instruments; presentation assessment, senior level 
assessment, and research extension exercise. The following paragraphs will 
briefly describe the purpose of the packages and how each package was used. 
C.1   Presentation Assessment 
The purpose of the presentation-briefing package is a vehicle to help 
acquire face validity of the concepts and process developed by those participants 
that may not be willing to read through the actual report. The first document is 
the research request sheet. This sheet is used to communicate the research 
objective, time required to present, the benefits, and the importance of the 
research. The second item in the package is the briefing that was presented to 
all participants. This is a powerpoint presentation that is used to communicate 
the background, the research intent, the concepts, the process, and future 
research. It contains some key points within the note pages. The third item is 
the data collection document used for individual feedback of presentation 
participants. The objective of this was to solicit the participant's opinion on the 
usefulness of the concepts and process. 
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C.2   Senior Level 
Although the appendix only holds the senior level critique form, the senior 
level package consist of a report outlining the background, the concepts, the 
process, and the next step for future research. The report used in this review 
resembles Chapter 4 of this thesis. The purpose of this package was to be able 
to forward the report with a critique form to senior and mid-level 10 managers for 
their viewpoint and suggestions. 
C.3   Research Extension Exercise 
The exercise package is similar to the presentation package, but is used 
for the "future" research called the next step (Appendix A). The purpose of the 
exercise is to identify IW weapon capabilities using the concepts presented in the 
research through the use of semi-structure brainstorming. 
An exercise research objective sheet was included in this package as well. 
It was also used to communication the exercise's objectives, time required of its 
participants, benefits to the participant, and the importance of this research. In 
addition, the package consisted of an exercise briefing, which was used to 
visually present the concepts and definitions used within the exercise.   The 
exercise narrative complimented and worked hand-in-hand with the briefing. The 
exercise narrative was a script or guide for the briefing and brainstorming 
session. The last document in this package was the exercise critique. Similar to 
the presentation critique, it's objective was to assess the usefulness, the 
usability, and the improvement recommendations from the individual participant. 
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Presentation Assessment Research Objectives: Acquire face validity of the developed 
process and derived concepts. 
This will be done by presenting the definitions, concepts, and process in a briefing to subject 
matter experts currently assigned to an IW Flight.   A one-page critique sheet will be used as a 
mechanism to assess the face validity of the usability and usefulness of the definitions, concepts, 
and process. 
Time Required: 1-1 Yz hours. The presentation should take approximately 45-60 minutes. 
Filling out the one page critique should take approximately 5-10 minutes. 
Benefits of the Experiment to you 
1. Exposure to an offensive IW-focused planning model. 
2. Exposure to the development of weapon characteristics and applicable EAIs. 
Why is this research important? 
This research will attempt to fill voids that exist in the implementation of IO/IW within the 
Air Force. There are three important missing links; dimensions of the infosphere affecting the 
decisions of an organization, a focus on the primary goal of offensive IW at the tactical level of 
operations, and IW weapon knowledge, that are not accounted for in any doctrine or operational 
concept. 
Currently, written guidance given to IO planners is focused on the state of the adversary 
and influencing the decision maker and his/her process. Although, these are very important 
pieces of the battlespace (know your enemy), proactively matching/modifying/building IW 
weapons and strength capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities of the adversary is the other very 
important piece of the battlespace that is not explicitly addressed or discussed. 
In order to build a stage for this type of knowledge to evolve, this research has identified 
the other two essential pieces; dimensions or the environment of IW and a definition of the 
primary goal of Offensive IW at the tactical level of operations. In addition, a process is proposed 
to help to further identify the required components within the Air Force environment. 
Several documents that guide IO development within the Air Force outline several 
concepts or requirements that this research may play a role in accomplishing. 
Joint Vision 2020 
1. It attempts to develop compatible processes and procedures 
2. It leverages the advantage of a systematic and new capability model 
3. Weapon knowledge necessary to exploit adversary's weaknesses 
AF IO Concept of Operations 
1. This helps to implement IO at the operational level 
2. It provides a good use of the "total" battlespace by matching our weapon "strengths" 
to the adversary's weaknesses. 
Concept of Operations for Effects Based Operations (Draft) 
1. Focus is placed on the "effects" of an action by attempting to identify applicable and 
appropriate MOEs and EAIs 
2. IO weapon characteristics will combine commander's intent/objectives, assessment 
indicators, and assessment feedback loop 
italicized items are concepts and requirements presented within the applicable 
document 
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After- Presentation Feedback Form 
PART1 
For each question, mark the box with an "X" that most closely matches your opinion. 
1. Does the process seem easy to use?  
Strongly Disagree Disagree No opinion Agree       Strongly Agree 
2.   Does the process seem useful for identifying different types of actions to 
be taken? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly Agree 
PART 2—What part of the presentation would you use in the future? 
Place a circle around (or a line of Xs next to) the "bolded" areas that you would use and write 
down any changes, additions, or modifications in the space provided below each concept. 
a.   Process 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
b.   Concepts 
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option 
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info 
Factors 
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points 
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs) 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
c.    Other, please add any not identified above. 
How would you incorporate your input into the current process? 
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PART 3—What part of the presentation would you NOT use in the future? 
Place a circle around those you would NOT use and write down any changes, additions, or 
modifications to the area in order for you to use it. 
a.     Process 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to use it? 
b.    Concepts 
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option 
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info 
Factors 
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points 
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs) 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to use it? 
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Senior Level Feedback Form 
PART1 
For each question, mark the box with an "X" that most closely matches your opinion. 
Use the space below each answer for any comments you may have. 
1. What is your opinion of the PROCESS presented in the research? 
Strongly Disapprove     Disapprove No opinion Approve Strongly Approve 
2. What is your opinion of the CONCEPTS presented in the research? 
IW as a Primary Weapon Option  
Strongly Disapprove     Disapprove No opinion Approve Strongly Approve 
Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info Factors 
Strongly Disapprove     Disapprove No opinion Approve Strongly Approve 
IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points 
Strongly Disapprove     Disapprove No opinion Approve Strongly Approve 
Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs) 
Strongly Disapprove Disapprove No opinion Approve Strongly Approve 
PART 2—What part of the research do you see as useful to the IO community? 
Place a circle around (or a line of Xs next to) the "bolded" areas that you would use and write 
down any changes, additions, or modifications in the space provided below each concept. 
a.   Process 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
b.  Concepts 
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option 
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the 
Info Factors 
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points 
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4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators 
(EAIs) 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
c.   Other, please add any not identified above. 
How would you incorporate your input into the current process? 
PART 3—What part of the research do you see as NOT useful to the 10 
community? 
Place a circle around (or a line of Xs next to) those you would NOT use and write down any 
changes, additions, or modifications to the area in order for you to use it. 
a.   Process 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to 
use it? 
b.    Concepts 
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option 
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info 
Factors 
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points 
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs) 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to use it? 
PART 4—General Comments 
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Research Extension Objectives: Validate the concepts of the IW Weaponeering and 
Force Application Phase of the proposed 10 Planning Process. 
This will be done by using the definitions and concepts of the proposed process through 
a structured brainstorm session in order to identify 10 weapon characteristics and 
applicable Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs) 
Time Required: 2-2 34 hours. Administrative information and a brief background will 
take approximately 10-15 minutes. The rest of the time is allotted for the brainstorming 
session. 
Benefits of the Experiment to you 
1. Exposure to a comprehensive planning model and procedures on how to employ 
it. 
2. Exposure to the development of weapon characteristics and applicable EAIs. 
Why is this research important? 
This research will attempt to fill voids that exist in the implementation of IO/IW at 
the tactical level. There are two important missing links in today's environment; new 
dimensions of the infosphere affecting the decision making process and IW weapon 
knowledge, that are not accounted for in any doctrine or operational concept. 
Currently, guidance given to IO planners is focused on the state of the adversary. 
Although, this is a very important piece of the battlespace (know your enemy), 
proactively matching/modifying/building IW weapons and strength capabilities to exploit 
vulnerabilities of the adversary is the other very important piece of the battlespace that is 
not explicitly addressed or discussed. 
Several documents that guide IO development within the Air Force outline 
several concepts or requirements that this research may play a role in accomplishing. 
Joint Vision 2020 
4. It attempts to develop compatible processes and procedures 
5. It leverages the advantage of a systematic and new capability model 
6. Weapon knowledge necessary to exploit adversary's weaknesses 
AF IO Concept of Operations 
3. This helps to implement 10 at the operational level 
4. It provides a good use of the "total"battlespace by matching our weapon 
"strengths" to the adversary's weaknesses. 
Concept of Operations for Effects Based Operations (Draft) 
3. Focus is placed on the "effects" of an action by attempting to identify 
applicable and appropriate MOEs and EAIs 
4. 10 weapon characteristics will combine commander's intent/objectives, 
assessment indicators, and assessment feedback loop 
italicized items are concepts and requirements presented within the applicable 
document 
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Exercise Weapon Characteristic and EAI Development 
Research Extension--Jan 2001 
Introduction-Good Afternoon/Morning 






Slide -Exercise Objectives 
Validate Systematic Approach to action characteristics 
You are being asked to participate in a step-by-step and systematic 
approach in order to validate a process for identifying how the information, 
information systems, and information based processes can be affected, more 
specifically, how information can be devalued. 
Slide -Exercise Focus 
Effects based 
Limited to Single Actions 
Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
Perfect Information Flow 
This is very important to remember because following a specific process is 
essential, therefore, there may be times, the approach we will be taking may not 
be very exciting and may be very obvious...there is a reason for it. Please bear 
with me and keep notes of your suggestions and concerns. Your notes can also 
be used for the after-session critiques/feedback 
Slide -Expectations 
You: 
1. Keep an open mind and don't be afraid of being different 
2. Keep the appropriate definitions in mind at all times 
3. Keep your experiment "NOTE SHEET" handy to jot down things you feel can 
be done better or in a more appropriate order of presentation. Of course, 
comments in general would also be appreciated. 
4. Ask questions if you do not understand! 
Facilitator: 
1. Keep the group on track and to follow the step-by-step approach 
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2. Answer questions with the best of my ability! 
The facilitator will be taking you through a series of brainstorming sessions. 
All you'll have to do is sit back and participate by thinking outside the box - 
- remember your input/concept could trigger some other angle we never thought 
about. 
Slide -Forms 
Before we get started, I'd like to quickly go over the forms and diagrams you have in 
front of you. These will be available to you throughout the exercise. 
1. Offensive IO Objective Model 
2. Offensive IO Attribute and IO Action Definitions 
3. Measures of Effectiveness Table 
4. Note Taker 
This ends the administrative related items, but before we get into the actual brainstorming 
session, I would like to first give you a quick overview of some of the key concepts that will be 
used in the exercise. 
Slide -Quick Overview 
Please be assured that they will be presented AGAIN, within the session, so please do not feel 
pressured to having to commit them to memory. 
Slide -Information Breakdown—Hierarchy 
HANDOUT 
We will be looking at the Information Realm and more specifically, how we can devalue 
the attributes of this environment. More specifically we will be looking at least, at one of 
the attributes from one of the main components of Information, Information Systems, 
Information Based Processes 
HIDDEN-Slides -Information Environment 
Information 
Information systems 
Information based processes 
Slide -Definitions 
Actions/Weapon Characteristics Definitions 
Tactics 
The "How to" of the action or the weapon system in order to effect 
the aimpoint as desired. 
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Platform 
The equipment or system used to transport the product or action to the intended 
target 
Payload 
The active agent or damage (effect) mechanism that "effects" the target. 
Levels of Effect 
Manipulate 
Deny-Not allow temporarily 
Detour-Deviate from a direct route or course of action 
Delay-Put off to a later time, slow or cause to be late 
Degrade-Lower in quality 
Disrupt-Disturb or interrupt 
Destroy-Wreck, ruin, kill, demolish 
Assessment Indicators 
Triggers/flags/activities that could signify success or failure 
Weapon—The effectiveness of the weapon's or action's effect to 
the intended information component and aimpoint. 
Method—The effectiveness of the tactics, platform, payload of the 
weapon or action chosen. 
Mission—The effectiveness of the action's effect on the decision 
made. 
The Brainstorm Session 
Possible Reference Sheet: 
Information Realm 
1. Given Items: Attribute and Weapon 
a.   We will be working on one specific attribute of one of the components at a 
time. 
The first one we will look at is under the component "Information 
Systems" and the attribute of "Reduce Bandwidth". 
Facilitator: Use this sequence for each attribute. Bandwidth is used as an 
example. 
b. The pillar of IO that we will be using is Computer Network Attack 
(CNA). 
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Goal 1: Identity the weapon (CNA) characteristics that affect the information 
component of "information systems" thru the use of devaluing or reducing the 
attribute of "bandwidth". 
NOTE: 
You may have to note "other characteristics" or have participants use their 
note takers so no inputs are lost due to timing. 
The sequence of identifying platforms and payloads may be intertwined...use 
the above caution, but don't squelch creativity. 
SEQUENCE—Weapon Characteristics 
a. First lets identify those methods or tactics that will "reduce bandwidth" 
Goal: Continue til suggestions cease or drift to other attributes or gets 
too detailed. 
Facilitator: At end and before proceeding group/consolidate "like" 
items together to shorten list, if possible. 
b. Now that we've listed methods of reducing bandwidth and consolidated like 
items, lets look at each one individually and identify the type of platform 
needed to deliver the action to the target. 
Goal: Continue til suggestions cease or drift to other attributes 
Facilitator: Identify a platform for each action, in most cases, the type 
of platform may be repeated and limited to just a couple of choices. 
c. Now that we've listed the methods and platforms, we now have to identify the 
payload for each item. 
Goal: Continue til suggestions cease or drift to other attributes 
Facilitator: Identify all possible payloads to be used with each method 
and platform. Again, you may see a lot of repetition, but continue and treat 
each "package" individually. 
d. For each package, determine if the package can be used at each level of 
effect.   For example; For this tactic, delivered with this platform, employing 
this payload...answer the following questions: Can it deny bandwidth? Can it 
degrade bandwidth? Can it disrupt bandwidth? Can it destroy bandwidth? 
Note: Most times, all "Ds" will be possible, but there has been times 
where not ALL Ds could be satisfied due to either the platform or payload 
being used. Be careful, not to breeze thru this! 
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SEQUENCE—Assessment Indicators 
a. For each "package" (one tactic, one platform, one payload) determine 
applicable assessment indicators. 
Identify at least ONE assessment indicator for each type of assessment type 
(weapon/action and method—MISSION WILL NOT BE IDENTIFIED) 
Note: Sequence is not important. The important item here is identifying at 
least one for each type. Use trigger "phrases" to prompt thought to the different 
types of indicators. 
b. Weapon/Action Effectiveness: For each attribute ask the question; Did the 
action devalue what we wanted it to attack; ie. bandwidth of an information 
system? 
Indicators: What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us 
if we devalued the correct attribute or component? 
Note: Use of the appropriate MOE could/should identify items that 
could tell us success or failure of the method. 
c. Method Effectiveness: For each method ask the question; Did the method 
use tactic/payload/platform achieve the desired affect? 
Indicators: What would be the possible indicators/triggers that could 
tell us if we had the appropriate effect due to this action? 
Note: Use of the appropriate MOE could/should identify items that 
could tell us success or failure of the method. 
Wrap UP 
I would like to thank you for your time and I would appreciate any 
comments you may have. 
You are welcome to take any handouts you have used during this session. 
The only item I ask that you leave behind are your note takers. Again, 
thank you for your time. I there are any questions or additional comments, I will 





For each question, mark the box with an "X" that most closely matches your opinion. 
1.   Is the process easy to use? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly Agree 
2. Is the process useful for identifying possible actions to be taken? 
Strongly Disagree     Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly Agree 
3.  Does the process help to identify actions that have the desired effect upon 
the Information Realm? 
For example: If the desired effect is to reduce bandwidth, does the 
process lead you to actions that will "reduce bandwidth"? 
Strongly Disagree     Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly Agree 
PART 2—What part of the exercise would you use in the future? 
Place a circle around or a line of XXXs next to the "bolded" areas that you 
would use and write down any changes, additions, or modifications in the space 
provided below each concept. 
a.   Process 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
b.  Brainstorming Session 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
c.   Concepts 
Factors 
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option 
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info 
C-14 
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points 
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs) 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
d.   IW Battlespace 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it? 
e.   Other, please add any not identified above. 
How would you incorporate your input into the current process? 
PART 3—What part of the exercise would you NOT use in the future? 
Place a circle around or a line of XXXXs next to those you would NOT use and write 
down any changes, additions, or modifications to the area in order for you to use it. 
a.   Process 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable 
you to use it? 
b. Brainstorming Session 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable 
you to use it? 
c.   Concepts 
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option 
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the 
Info Factors 
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points 
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs) 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable 
you to use it? 
C-15 
d.  IW Battlespace 
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable 
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